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Abstract 
In a special report in 2010, The Economist called the resurgence of state-owned mega-enterprises, especially those 
in emerging economies, “Leviathan Inc.”, and warned about the dangers of the state capitalism model. 
Traditionally, state-owned firms have been criticized for poor governance and questionable efficiency. In fact, 
they may be better positioned to deal with market failures and externalities. Our findings based on publicly-listed 
firms in 45 countries suggest that government-controlled companies engage more in environmental issues, and 
this engagement does not come at a cost to shareholder value. The effect is more pronounced among firms in 
emerging market economies and in countries with higher energy risks. The effect is attributable to ownership 
stakes held directly by domestic governments, rather than to foreign state ownership or investment via sovereign 
wealth funds. Difference-in-differences estimates show that state-owned firms reacted more significantly to the 
2009 Copenhagen Accord in improving their environmental performance. Interestingly, state-owned firms also 
engage more in social issues, but they do not reveal better corporate governance performance. 
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1. Introduction  
With the rise of emerging market economies in the last two decades, the role of state capitalism has attracted new 
attention. In China, companies in which the state is a majority shareholder account for over 60% of total stock 
market capitalization. Other emerging market governments such as Brazil or Russia also hold majority or 
significant minority stakes in local companies. These holdings can be direct through central or local governments 
but also indirect in the form of public pension funds or sovereign wealth funds. This pattern is contrary to that in 
many Western economies where large-scale privatizations in the 1980s and 1990s led to the decline in the role of 
the state in business. In the post-privatization era of the early 21st century, some of the world’s largest publicly-
listed firms are now state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In fact, Table 1 shows that 10 of the top 30 global public 
companies as ranked by Forbes magazine in 2010 were SOEs.
1
  
The Economist (2010, 2014) calls these resurging state-owned mega-enterprises “Leviathan Inc.”, especially 
those in emerging economies, and warns about the danger of such a state capitalism model.
2
 There is a large 
literature on the economic inefficiency of state ownership, mostly based on the agency cost view (Megginson et 
al. (1994), Shleifer (1998), Dewenter and Malatesta (2001)). This view argues that SOE managers are chosen for 
political reasons, have low-powered incentives, and are poorly monitored by boards packed with politicians 
(Shleifer and Vishny (1998); La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999)). Political elites who control SOEs may seek 
rents from society at the expense of other stakeholders, which can reduce economic efficiency through corruption, 
poor resource allocation, less innovation and skewed wealth creation. Yet other studies re-examining SOEs in 
emerging markets document some positive effects of this “new state capitalism” (Musacchio and Lazzarini 
(2014); Musacchio, Lazzarini, and Aguilera (2015)). There is some suggestion that SOEs may help emerging 
markets deal with market failures and externalities.  
One crucial way state ownership of businesses can be a positive factor in the public interest is in addressing 
climate change. While developed nations have been the largest contributors to global warming, the growth rate in 
new emissions is now concentrated in emerging market economies. In 2010, the countries emitting the most 
greenhouse gases were China (22%), the U.S. (13%), the EU-28 (10%), India (5%), and Brazil (5%), according to 
the EU’s EDGAR data.3 In September 2016, the Hangzhou G20 Summit focused on “green finance”, and the U.S. 
and China ratified the Paris climate change agreement. Governments can promote green technology by imposing 
                                                          
1 This marked presence of state ownership among the world’s biggest companies may be understated, given that the Forbes Global 2000 
covers only publicly-listed listed companies. For example, Saudi Aramco, the biggest energy company in the world, which has been 
estimated to be the world’s most valuable company, has been 100% owned by the Saudi Arabian government since 1980.  
2 “Leviathan” is something that is very large and powerful, or a sea monster in scriptural accounts. Leviathan is generally used to refer to 
the political state after its use in Thomas Hobbes’ “Leviathan or The Matter, Forme and Power of a Common Wealth Ecclesiastical and 
Civil” (1651).  
3 Emission Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR) classifies CO2, CH4, N2O, and F-gases as greenhouse gases (GHG). 
Under the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC), countries submit their inventories of GHG. The 
emission time series 1990-2012 per region/country is available in http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/overview.php?v=GHGts1990-
2012&sort=des9. The country rankings based purely on CO2 emissions for 2014 are similar: China (31%) US (22%), EU-28 (14%), India 
(12%), and Russia (10%). These data are available at: http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/overview.php?v=CO2ts1990-2014&sort=des9. 
3 
carbon taxes and providing research subsidies (Laffont and Tirole (1993), Acemoglu, Akcigit, Hanley, and Kerr 
(2016)). For example, in the U.S., green industrial policies include laws such as the Clean Air Act, tools like 
federal tax credits and programs such as state-level renewable portfolio standards. Rodrik (2014), however, 
concludes that these policies are “strong in theory, ambiguous in practice” (p.470). Alternatively, the state can use 
its “visible hand” by intervening in the form of stakes in public corporations. Initiatives related to environmental 
protection usually require substantial investment and long-term resource commitment, which private firms often 
cannot meet. State-owned firms, though, can coordinate resources through government procurement and state 
funding (examples including oil or other natural resources funds and public pension funds) to support such green 
investment.  
As companies from China and other emerging market countries transition from dirty to clean technology and 
reduce fossil fuel emissions to limit climate change, the role of state ownership can be important. UNEP (2016) 
estimates that in 2015, for the first time, the investment in renewable energies in emerging countries outweighed 
that in developed economies. A large element in this turnaround was China, which contributed to over a third of 
the world in total, based on data from Bloomberg New Energy Finance.  
Standard economic theories usually suggest that the private sector (the market) pursues profit maximization 
and efficiency, while the public sector (the state) corrects market failures such as negative externalities that 
corporations generate for the environment (Benabou and Tirole (2010)). Companies in developed countries tend 
to exhibit more shareholder-friendly corporate governance and perform better in terms of shareholder value 
maximization (Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, and Williamson (2009)). Yet these companies do not internalize 
environmental (and social) costs. A company might improve shareholder value by outsourcing production to 
developing countries with looser environmental regulations. Firms in emerging countries may not have full 
incentives to pursue environmentally sustainable practices and instead maximize profits by using more polluting 
technologies. In this respect, emerging market SOEs may be the most prone to improve their environmental 
standards because of their state ownership. 
We conduct an international study of the impact of state ownership on a firm’s engagement in environmental, 
social, and governance (ESG) issues. We compile a dataset of the level of state ownership and measures of ESG 
performance of publicly-listed firms in 45 countries over 2004-2014. There is considerable cross-country 
variation in state ownership in our sample. State ownership is more prevalent in emerging markets (24.8% of 
publicly-listed companies) than in developed economies (4.0%). SOEs represent more than 60% of the stock 
market in China, close to 40% in Russia, about 20% in Brazil, and 10% in France. They are insignificant in the 
U.S. and in other major developed economies. The prevalence of SOEs also differs across industries; in 
telecommunications, utilities, oil and gas, and financial services the government has greater presence. We focus 
primarily on how state ownership can address corporate environmental sustainability (the “E” in ESG) as it 
measures how a firm addresses market failures and externalities generated via its operation. We also touch on 
4 
other sustainability issues such as corporate engagement in social issues (S) and corporate governance (G), and 




Our findings are that SOEs engage more in environmental issues, especially in emission reduction and 
resource reduction. We provide evidence suggesting that state ownership has a causal effect on corporate 
environmental engagement by showing that SOEs reacted more significantly to the Copenhagen Accord signed in 
December 2009 in improving their environmental performance. Arguably, the Copenhagen Conference raised 
awareness of the severity of climate change and other environmental problems, which shifted the demand for 
environmental engagement by corporations worldwide. The results from difference-in-differences regressions are 
consistent with the notion that state-owned firms can be more proactive in dealing with environmental 
externalities.  
Exploration of potential channels for the effect also supports a causal interpretation of our main findings. We 
document a stronger role of SOEs in environmental engagement among firms in energy-related industries 
(particularly in oil and gas), in countries with more energy independence, and in countries with greater conflict 
with neighboring states that may disrupt or cut necessary energy sources. We also document that the positive 
effect of state ownership on environmental engagement exists mainly in the subsample of companies in emerging 
countries rather than developed countries. We do not find such a pattern for other types of block-owners beyond 
the government, and we do not find it in firms held by foreign governments or by sovereign wealth funds. These 
results help further define the mechanism through which state ownership is related to solving environmental 
externalities: It stems from the fact that the state is the controlling owner and is not simply a mechanical effect of 
concentrated ownership.  
Interestingly, we document that SOEs also engage more in social responsibility issues, but we find that they 
do not have better corporate governance practices. We also show that SOEs’ environmental engagement does not 
come at a cost to shareholder value in terms of Tobin’s Q and long-term profitability. We conclude that state 
control does not assume superior corporate governance or greater returns to shareholders, but it does contribute to 
the welfare of society at large, without significantly sacrificing shareholder interests. 
Our work contributes to the developing literature on government involvement in public companies. The 
classical view of SOEs has typically been framed around the conflicting operational, financial, and social 
objectives that these companies face (e.g., Megginson and Netter (2001), Chen, Jiang, Ljungqvist, Lu and Zhou, 
(2017)). State-owned firms usually have weaker corporate governance and poorer financial performance (e.g., 
Megginson, Nash, and van Randenborgh (1994); Dewenter and Malatesta (2001); Megginson and Netter (2001); 
Bortolotti and Faccio (2009)). The privatization waves in emerging markets in the last decades, however, might 
                                                          
4 We use the terms “environmental engagement” and “sustainability” interchangeably throughout. 
5 
have heralded the rise of a new breed of SOEs. Recent studies document that “Leviathans” can achieve good 
financial performance (e.g., Inoue, Lazzarini, and Musacchio (2013), Cuervo-Cazurra et al. (2014), Musacchio, 
Lazzarini, and Aguilera (2015)). There is also a growing literature of government investment. Karolyi and Liao 
(2015) document the growing amount of cross-border acquisition activities by SOEs, particularly those in 
emerging markets. A large part of sovereign wealth funds’ investments also come from emerging markets 
(Dewenter, Han, and Malatesta (2010); Kotter and Lel (2011); Bortolotti, Fotak, and Megginson (2015)). Our 
contribution is to show that the state capitalism model can be effective in addressing market failures and 
environmental externalities. 
Our work also speaks to the growing finance literature on how ownership structure affects corporate 
environmental engagement. There has been debate on the effects of ESG on shareholder value. Some authors 
document a positive effect (Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen (2009); Servaes and Tamayo (2013); Hong and 
Liskovich (2015); Ferrell, Liang, and Renneboog (2016); Lins, Servaes, and Tamayo (2016)). Others find a 
negative effect (Masulis and Reza (2015); Cheng, Hong, and Shue (2016)). In the U.S., large institutional 
investors have been shown to yield some power in terms of shareholder proposals and voting (Del Guercio and 
Tran (2012)) and private engagements (Dimson, Karakas, and Li (2015)). Internationally, finance research has 
focused on how shareholders affect mostly the “G” dimension (corporate governance). For example, foreign 
institutional investors also seem to impact corporate governance and long-term investment positively (Aggarwal, 
Erel, Ferreira, and Matos (2011); Bena, Ferreira, Matos, and Pires (2016)). Dyck, Lins, Roth, and Wagner (2016) 
examine how foreign institutional investors impact E&S. The authors find an effect only when institutional 
investors come from countries with high E&S social norms while, interestingly, U.S. institutions have no 
significant impact on firms overseas. Hopner, Oikonomou, Sautner, Starks, and Zhou (2016) examine how ESG 
shareholder engagement by a large institutional investor can reduce downside risk but this tends to be 
concentrated in the governance dimension. Our contribution is to show that state ownership appears to be 
positively correlated with E (and to some extent with S, but not with G). We also find that shareholder value is not 
negatively affected by such engagement in non-shareholder issues by SOEs.  
 
2. Sample and Summary Statistics 
We first describe how we compile the data and introduce our key variables: state ownership and corporate 
environmental engagement. We then delineate our sample and control variables. Finally, we show the summary 




2.1. Data and Variables 
2.1.1. State Ownership 
The primary data on state ownership come from Orbis, a Bureau van Dijk database. This data source 
provides the types of ultimate owners of over 70,000 publicly-listed companies around the world.
5
 This data 
source has previously been used to measure state ownership in “State-Owned Enterprises” by OECD (2013). An 
“ultimate owner” is identified by following the path of uninterrupted control rights if there is an ownership 
pyramid. A company is defined as state-owned if the ultimate owner is a public authority, a state, or a government 
entity with the percentage of voting rights exceeding 25% in every layer of the ownership pyramid. The main 
variable of interest in our study is State_own, a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is state-owned, and 
zero otherwise. 
The most common example of a state-owned company occurs when the government of the country in which 
the company is headquartered has direct ownership that exceeds 25%. The largest stakes would be held directly 
by central or federal governments (e.g., the government of China or Brazil) and related entities (e.g., the China 
State-Owned Assets Supervision & Administration Commission), as well as state-level governments (e.g., the 
states of Shanghai or Sao Paulo) or through a development bank (e.g., BNDES in Brazil). In other cases, the state 
can exert control over a company through alternative channels. First, some firms may be owned by a group of 
governments, such as the Scandinavian airline company SAS, which is jointly owned by the governments of 
Sweden, Norway, and Finland, each holding less than 25% of the company’s shares. Second, a company may be 
owned by a foreign government, instead of a home country government; an example is Indosat in Indonesia, 
(originally controlled by the government of Indonesia, and then by the government of Singapore from 2003 
through 2007, and owned by the Government of Qatar since).
6
 Foreign government controlling instances usually 
happen when a state-owned company or a sovereign wealth fund (e.g., GIC and Temasek for Singapore or the 
Qatar Investment Authority) acquires a majority stake in companies overseas. Third, selling a stake to a foreign 
state-owned firm does not necessarily imply majority-ownership by a foreign state. For example, EDP Energias 
de Portugal, a company that was majority-owned by Parpublica (owned by the government of Portugal), sold its 
shares in 2011, with China Three Gorges becoming the largest shareholder but holding less than 25%. Thus we 
consider EDP Energias de Portugal as state-owned before 2012, but no longer state-owned since 2012. Finally, 
some firms were initially not state-owned but ultimately become nationalized. A notable example is ABN AMRO, 
which was nationalized in 2010 by the Dutch government.  
                                                          
5 We do not include SOEs that are not publicly-listed companies so the state presence is underestimated in our study. 
6 Other examples of foreign state ownership include Chartered Semiconductor Manufacturing (a Singaporean company currently controlled 
by GlobalFoundries, which is owned by the government of UAE), J Sainsbury (a U.K. company currently controlled by Qatar Holdings 
LLC); Tav Havalimanlari (a Turkish company currently controlled by Aéroports de Paris, which is itself owned by the government of 
France); Gallaher Group (a UK company currently controlled by Japan Tobacco, which is owned by the government of Japan); and 
ORANGE Polska (a Polish company owned by the government of France through France Telecom [ORANGE]). 
7 
Orbis takes into account many of the special cases of state ownership, but we manually cross-check the data 
for possible mismeasurement of state-owned status. First, companies in some countries issue different classes of 
shares, such as preferred shares and ordinary shares in Brazil, and our sample may cover only one class of these 
shares. For example, the government of Brazil owns over 50% stakes of Petróleo Brasileiro (Petrobras) through 
holding of ordinary shares, but Orbis originally includes only the security code for its preferred shares. The result 
is that Petrobras was first classified as non-state-owned which we corrected. Second, in some countries such as 
China, many publicly-listed companies are owned by a private parent company, which is then owned by the 
government. Orbis does not properly identify these private parent companies as state-owned. For example, Zijin 
Mining in China is majority-owned (>25%) by Minxi Xinghang State-Owned Assets Investment Co. Ltd., which 
is a private company controlled by the Chinese government. To correct for such mismeasurements of state 
ownership, we consult three major databases for ownership information—Orbis, FactSet/Lionshares, and 
Datastream—to cross-check all companies in our sample. As long as a company is identified as state-owned 
according to our criteria in any of the three databases, we consider the company as potentially state-owned. We 
then further manually check this company’s annual reports and other public sources to see whether its ultimate 
owner is a state entity.  
Finally, we use an alternative measure of state ownership which is continuous and based on government-held 
free-floating shares (Government_held), which we obtain from Datastream. This variable measures the 
percentage of floating shares held directly by governments if holdings are greater than 5%. The variable includes 
only the ownership in the first layer, does not trace up to higher levels in the case of an ownership pyramid, and 
does not measure non-floating shares held by governments. Despite its limitations, we obtain consistent results 
using this alternative measure of state ownership. 
2.1.2. Corporate Environmental (and Social and Governance) Engagement 
To evaluate corporate engagement in environmental issues (as well as in social and governance issues), we 
use data from Thomson Reuter’s ASSET4 Environmental, Social, and Corporate Governance (ESG) database.7 
The ASSET4 sample covers more than 4,500 global publicly listed companies that are included in major equity 
indices.
8
 The ASSET4 ratings consist of more than 750 ESG sub-dimensions (data points). Every data point goes 
through a multi-step verification process, including a series of data entry checks, automated quality rules, and 
historical comparisons. These data points reflect more than 280 key performance indicators and are rated as both a 
normalized score (0 to 100, with 50 as the industry mean) and the actual computed value. The equally-weighted 
average is then normalized by ASSET4 so that each firm is given a score relative to the performance of all firms 
in the same industry around the world. All ratings are provided on a yearly basis. For all companies, at least three 
                                                          
7 In robustness checks, we consider the Environmental Pillar Score in the MSCI ESG Intangible Value Assessment (“MSCI”) database and 
the Environmental Pillar Score in the Sustainalytics ESG Ratings database.  
8 These indices include the S&P 500, Russell 1000, NASDAQ 100, MSCI Europe, FTSE 250, ASX 300, STOXX 600, the MSCI World 
Index, the MSCI Emerging Market index, among other major equity indices. This database has been used by Ioannou and Serafeim (2012). 
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years of history are available, and most companies are covered from 2005 onward. Thus the effective time-series 
of our sample firms are about ten years on average. Firms are rated on the basis of their ESG compliance 
(regulatory requirements) and their ESG engagement (voluntary initiatives). Therefore, the ESG ratings reflect a 
comprehensive evaluation of how a firm engages in stakeholder issues and complies with regulations. We 
primarily focus on the “E” ratings.  
One may raise the concern that the ASSET4 sample is biased toward certain countries such as the U.S., the 
U.K., Japan, and Germany. In fact, the sample is constructed by tracking major equity indices that cover the 
largest companies around the world, as in other cross-country studies. A manual check of the data confirms that 
almost all major multinational corporations in the Fortune 1000 are in our sample. Therefore, the results from our 
sample can be interpreted as environmental engagement for the world’s largest companies, whatever their country 
or origin. This is consistent with the idea that larger firms have greater societal and environmental impacts. 
In the main analysis, we focus on a company’s overall environmental performance score (ENVSCORE), and 
three sub-aggregate level scores: Product Innovation (ENPI), Resource Reduction (ENRR), and Emission 
Reduction (ENER). ENPI (Product Innovation) measures a company’s management commitment to and its 
effectiveness in supporting the research and development of eco-efficient products or services. The score is 
compiled by checking for environmental benefits in the products or services of the reporting organization (such as 
introduction of environmentally friendly products). It is intended to reflect a company’s ability to reduce 
environmental costs and burdens for its customers, and thereby create new market opportunities through new 
environmental technologies and processes or eco-designed, dematerialized products with extended durability. 
ENRR (Resource Reduction) measures a company’s management commitment to and its effectiveness in 
achieving an efficient use of natural resources in the production process. The score is compiled by monitoring 
national resources reported to be used during production like water and energy. It reflects a company’s ability to 
reduce the use of materials, energy, or water, and to find more eco-efficient solutions by improving supply chain 
management. ENER (Emission Reduction) measures a company’s management commitment to and its 
effectiveness in reducing environmental emission in production and operational processes. The score reflects a 
company’s capacity to reduce air emissions (greenhouse gases, F-gases, ozone-depleting substances, NOx and 
SOx), waste and hazardous waste, water discharges, and spills, or its impacts on biodiversity, and to partner with 
environmental organizations to reduce the company’s environmental impact on the local or broader community. 
In supplemental tests, we also investigate companies’ engagement in social issues and corporate governance 
issues by analyzing data on non-environmental dimensions from ASSET4, such as the social pillar score and the 
corporate governance pillar score. The social pillar score (SOCSCORE) measures a company’s ability to generate 
trust and loyalty in its workforce, customers, and society, through its adoption of best management practices. The 
score is a reflection of a company’s reputation and the health of its license to operate, which are key factors in 
determining its ability to generate long-term shareholder value. Dimensions examined include: product 
9 
responsibility, community, human rights, diversity and opportunity, employment quality, health and safety, and 
training and development. The corporate governance pillar score (CGVSCORE) measures a company’s systems 
and processes, which ensure that its board members and executives act in the best interests of its long-term 
shareholders. The score reflects a company’s ability, through its use of best management practices, to direct and 
control its rights and responsibilities through the creation of incentives, as well as checks and balances in order to 
generate long-term shareholder value. Dimensions examined are: board functions, board structure, compensation 
policy, vision and strategy, and shareholder rights.  
2.1.3. Sample and Control Variables  
Table 1 shows that the top 10 state-owned enterprises feature prominently in the Forbes Global 2000 list of 
top companies as ranked by Forbes magazine in 2010.
9
 These companies, highlighted in bold, include four SOEs 
from China (ICBC, PetroChina, China Construction Bank, and Bank of China), two from France (GDF Suez and 
EDF Group) and one each from Russia (Gazprom), Brazil (Petrobras), the U.K. (Lloyds), and Italy (ENI). SOEs 
play an important role in both developed and emerging economies. While these SOEs score relatively well in 
terms of environmental performance (ENVSCORE, and its sub-scores) and social performance (SOCSCORE), a 
large majority of SOEs seem more poorly governed according to the corporate governance pillar score 
(CGVSCORE) than non-SOEs. 
To conduct a large-scale study, we assemble a panel data set consisting of 4,856 firms over 13 years (2002-
2014). It includes firms headquartered in a total of 45 countries in five geographic regions.
10
 Data availability 
across the years is described in the Internet Appendix. Table IA.1 shows an increasing pattern in the number of 
firms with available ENVSCORE in the ASSET4 database. There are only 955 and 966 observations available in 
2002 and 2003, respectively, surging to 1,819 observations in 2004 and then more than 4,000 by 2014. We thus 
drop 2002 and 2003 from the main analysis to avoid biasing our baseline results by insufficient coverage. In 
untabulated results, we obtain consistent results if we include 2002 and 2003 in the sample. In the last column of 
Table IA.1 are the numbers of observations we use in our baseline regression analysis. 
We control for common firm-level covariates included in most corporate finance research, such as total assets, 
leverage, market-to-book ratios and return on assets, obtaining the data from Datastream and Compustat Global. 
Definitions of the list of variables are provided in the Appendix. Following Dyck, Lins, Roth, and Wagner (2016), 
who find that sustainability can be driven by institutional investors (especially foreign ones), we control for a 
company’s institutional ownership (including both domestic and foreign institutional holdings). Data on 
                                                          
9 We choose 2010 to report these figures for data comparability with the figures quoted in The Economist (2010). The year 2010 is also in 
the middle of our sample period.  
10 The regions consist of Africa and Middle East (Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Turkey, and South Africa); Asia Pacific (Australia, China, Hong 
Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Philippines, Malaysia, New Zealand, South Korea, Thailand, and Singapore); Europe (Austria, Belgium, 
The Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the U.K.); Latin America (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru); and 
North America (Canada and the U.S.). 
10 
institutional ownership are collected from Factset/LionShares. Moreover, given the cross-country nature of our 
data, we control for country-level GDP per capita obtained from the World Bank. Finally, we control for country 
and year fixed effects.  
2.2. Summary Statistics 
Figure 1 provides the average percentage of state-owned firms in our sample of publicly-listed companies in 
each country during the 2004-2014 sample period. There is considerable cross-country variation. SOEs represent 
more than 60% of the market in China, close to 40% in Russia, about 20% in Brazil, and 10% in France, but are 
insignificant in countries such as the U.S. Figure 2 shows the evolution of the proportion of state-owned firms 
(both equal-weighted and value-weighted) in five geographic regions over the sample period.
11
 In both panels, we 
see an increase in SOEs in emerging economies such as Asia Pacific and Latin America. At the same time, there 
is a decline of SOEs in Africa and Middle East in our sample. State ownership in Europe remains at relatively 
modest levels throughout the period, and it is virtually absent in North America.  
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the average environmental pillar score by presenting the time-series of 
ENVSCORE in companies in the five geographic regions. We observe that North American firms are ranked the 
lowest in environmental pillar scores (ENVSCORE), although they have improved over time. European firms are 
ranked most highly in terms of environmental scores. Some fluctuations are observed for firms in the other three 
regions, but they do not reveal a clear pattern. In the second graph, we present value-weighted averages, and find 
similar patterns for European and North American companies. Comparing the two graphs suggests that larger 
corporations have higher levels of environmental engagement. In Figures IA.1 and IA.2, we present the time 
series of average social pillar score (SOCSCORE) and the average corporate governance pillar score 
(CGVSCORE) in companies in the five geographic regions. While we find that European firms are ranked most 
highly in terms of social scores, North American firms (mainly US firms) are ranked most highly in terms of 
corporate governance. These differences suggest that firms in different countries and regions tend to pursue 
different corporate objectives, and we examine these differences later.       
In Panel A of Table 2 we show the distribution of firm-year observations (and unique firms) across countries 
for the sample in our regressions. Leading the list are firms in developed markets (the U.S., Japan, the U.K., 
Australia, and Canada), but the sample has a reasonable coverage of firms in emerging economies, in particular 
the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). Overall, we have a sample of 28,890 firm-
year observations (4,009 unique firms) for which data are available for all dependent and independent variables in 
the baseline regressions.  
                                                          
11 We do not include the averages of Africa and Middle East and Latin America in 2004-2007 because there are insufficient observations in 
these region-years. Since ASSET4 data coverage is expanding over our sample period, we checked if the patterns in Figure 2 are influenced 
by sample composition changes. We confirm that this is not the case, as we find the same time trend when we keep the sample of firms the 
same as the ones in the 2010 cohort. 
11 
Panel A of Table 2 shows that the average level of state ownership (State_own) of our sample is 6.6%. There 
is a marked difference between emerging markets (24.8%) and developed economies (4.0%). The country with 
the highest proportion of state-owned companies in our sample is China (65.1%). Levels are also high for other 
emerging countries (Colombia, Malaysia, Indonesia, Poland, Thailand, Russia, and Czech Republic) and 
Singapore. The presence of the state in the corporate sector is relatively low in more developed economies 
(Germany, the U.K., Canada, Japan, and the U.S.). Table 2 also shows the average of environmental pillar scores 
(ENVSCORE) in each country. The average environmental pillar score is 51.5, which is to be expected, as all ESG 
scores are industry-adjusted by Thomson Reuters to get a middle point of 50. Firms in developed countries tend to 
score better than those in emerging countries (French firms are highest at 76.9 while Egyptian firms rank at the 
bottom with an average score of 19.6). Except for China (26.0), the average environmental pillar scores of the 




In a first look at the relation between state ownership and environmental engagement, we conduct a t-test for 
the equality of ENVSCORE between SOEs (firms with at least 25% of control rights owned by the government) 
and non-SOEs. The average ENVSCORE for state-owned firms is 57.4 compared to 51.1 for non-SOEs. The 
difference is statistically significant (p-value of 0.00). When we look at each individual country, we find SOE 
environmental pillar scores are higher than non-SOE scores in 31 of 45 countries (the difference is statistically 
significant in 23 countries at the 10% level). These findings provide preliminary evidence on the link between 
state ownership and environmental engagement. We find similar country-level results for the sub-categories of 
emission reduction (ENER), environmental product innovation (ENPI), and environmental resource reduction 
category (ENRR) scores. We also report the results of a t-test for the equality of these sub-scores between SOEs 
and non-SOEs in Table IA.2 in the Internet Appendix. SOEs receive significantly higher scores than non-SOEs do 
in more countries across all three sub-categories. 
There is large cross-country variation in the average of social pillar scores. Developed country firms score 
more highly than emerging markets countries. In Table IA.2 of the Internet Appendix, we test whether SOEs have 
higher SOCSCORE than non-SOEs and find statistically significant difference in 24 countries (at the 10% 
significance level). Interestingly, we find the opposite correlation between state ownership and corporate 
governance: The SOEs’ average score (CGVSCORE) is 41.7, significantly lower than other firms’ average score 
of 54.2.  
In Panel B of Table 2 we show summary statistics across ten major industries. State ownership is high in 
Telecommunications (31.7%) and Utilities (25.6%) and low in Health Care (1.0%), Consumer Goods (1.9%), and 
Technology (2.1%). Comparing the environmental pillar scores, we find that SOEs have higher ENVSCORE in 
                                                          
12 In untabulated results, the results on the relation between state ownership and environmental engagement remain consistent when we 
remove the five BRICS countries from the regression sample.   
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seven of ten industries. It is noteworthy that the three industries in which the non-SOEs’ ENVSCORE is higher 
than the SOEs’ (Industrials, Consumer Goods, and Health Care) are industries with fairly low state ownership 
(5.3%, 1.9%, and 1.0%). In other words, in industries with a stronger government presence, we find SOEs are 
more active in terms of environmental issues. Similarly, in industries with greater government presence, state-
owned firms also have a higher social pillar scores (SOCSCORE), which echoes our finding in ENVSCORE. 
Finally, we find that SOEs are associated with lower corporate governance pillar scores (CGVSCORE) in all 10 
industries. This finding is consistent with Panel A of Table 2, suggesting that on average state-owned firms are 
weaker in corporate governance. We report sub-category scores (ENER, ENPI, and ENRR) and t-test results for 
the equality of the sub-scores, SOCSCORE, and CGVSCORE, between SOEs and non-SOEs in Table IA.3 in the 
Internet Appendix. 
We find that the univariate analysis patterns documented above are persistent across time. In Table IA.4 in the 
Internet Appendix, we document that SOEs are associated with significantly higher ENVSCORE and SOCSCORE 
for every sample year from 2004 through 2014. In addition, SOEs are associated with a significantly lower 
CGVSCORE in every sample year.  
Results of these univariate comparisons should be interpreted with caution because we have not controlled for 
several firm-level factors. Panel A of Table 3 presents summary statistics of the key variables in the multivariate 
regressions we implement later in our study. On average, about 6% of our sample firms are classified as state-
owned. As expected, the sustainability scores (the ENVSCORE and its sub-scores, as well as SOCSCORE and 
CGVSCORE) have a mean of around 50 as they are normalized scores, but there exists variation across 
observations. Panel B of Table 3 reports Pearson correlation coefficients for all variables in the regressions. We 
find that state ownership is positively and significantly correlated with all environmental engagement proxies, and 
multicollinearity is unlikely to be a concern. 
 
3. Empirical Results on State Ownership and Environmental Engagement 
We test the relation between state ownership and corporate engagement in environmental issues using 
multivariate regressions. We present results from the baseline regression and explore several potential 
mechanisms that might account for the association between state ownership and environmental sustainability.  
3.1. Baseline Regression  
Our baseline regression is specified as follows: 
𝐸𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1+ 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1+ 𝛽3𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1)+ 𝛽4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1+ 𝛽5𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 
+ 𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1+ 𝛽7𝐿𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡)  + 𝛴 𝝆 ∗ 𝐼(𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗) + ∑ 𝜹 ∗ 𝐼(𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡)  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,           (1) 
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where ENVi,t+1 denotes the environmental engagement proxies (ENVSCORE, ENER, ENPI, and ENRR) of firm i 
listed in country j in year t. The primary explanatory variable, State_owni,t-1, is an indicator variable that equals 
one if firm i is state-owned in year t-1 and zero otherwise. Other control variables include the percentage of 
institutional ownership (Inst_owni,t-1), firm size (total assets in logarithm, Ln(Assetsi,t-1)), leverage (Leveragei,t-1), 
market-to-book ratio (MTBi,t-1), return on assets (ROAi,t-1), and GDP per capita in logarithm (Ln(GDPi,t)). All the 
control variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles. We also control for country and year fixed effects 
by including I(Countryj) and I(Yeart) which are series of dummy variables denoting each country and each year. 
We do not include industry fixed effects because the dependent variables are already industry-benchmarked 
(industry adjusted) as explained earlier. We estimate Equation (1) using ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions 
and all firm-year observations with non-missing values in all dependent and independent variables over 2004-
2014.
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 Given that we use a relatively short panel data set (and environmental investment is usually a long-term 
commitment), that environmental scores are industry-benchmarked, and that state ownership is quite stable over 
the sample period, we do not use industry × year fixed effects or country × year fixed effects in the baseline 
specifications because of multicollinearity concerns. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level to correct for 
firm-specific autocorrelation in estimation errors. 
Table 4 reports the estimation results for Equation (1). We first estimate the equation using only state 
ownership (State_own) as well as country and year fixed effects (Column (1)). The point estimate of state 
ownership at 3.99 is statistically significant at the 1% level. Given that the dependent variable is standardized on a 
scale of 0-100, this suggests that state-ownership on average gives a firm an environmental score that is about 4% 
higher than non-state-owned firms (or about 7.7% of sample mean and 12.5% of sample standard deviation). In 
Column (2), when we include all other control variables in the estimation, the state ownership effect is slightly 
reduced, but remains statistically significant at the 10% level. 
We also investigate which aspects drive the association between state ownership and environmental 
sustainability by replacing the dependent variable with ENER (in Columns (3) and (4)), ENPI (Columns (5) and 
(6)), and ENRR (Columns (7) and (8)). One can see that the effects of the overall environmental score come from 
emission reduction and resource reduction, but not much from product innovation, as the coefficients on 
State_own in Columns (5) and (6) are not statistically significant (but still positive).  
Environmental sustainability scores are higher in firms with greater institutional ownership, and firms that are 
bigger, with higher market-to-book ratios, and are more profitable. These results are consistent with findings in 
the literature that the presence of institutional investors promotes socially responsible corporate behavior (see 
Dyck, Lins, Roth, and Wagner (2016)) and the “doing well by doing good” argument that more profitable 
companies care more about sustainability (see Hong, Kubik, and Sheinkman (2012)).  
                                                          
13 The dependent variables are bounded between 0 and 100. In a robustness check, we use logarithmic value of environmental engagement 
proxies and obtain consistent results. 
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Overall, the results in Table 4 support a positive relation between state ownership and environmental 
engagement, especially in emission reduction and resource reduction. The insignificant correlation between state 
ownership and environmental production innovation may indicate that SOEs are not more innovative in creating 
new products and processes. State-owned firms may be taking more technologically conservative approaches but 
not proactive ones in environmental engagement. It is also worth noting that a firm’s state-control status is 
generally quite stable over time, especially during our sample period, which is likely a legacy of pre-privatization 
ownership structures. Therefore, our results are more in line with the idea that state ownership promotes more 
environmental engagement, rather than that governments as owners pick “green companies” to invest in. 
3.2. Identification Test Based on Passage of the 2009 Copenhagen Accord 
Our baseline results suggest a positive association between state ownership and a firm’s environmental 
engagement. To examine whether such an association is causal, we examine a shock to worldwide awareness of 
environmental sustainability and investigate whether the state-controlled firms in our sample react differently. The 
exogenous shock we look at is the Climate Change Summit held in Copenhagen in 2009.
14
 The Copenhagen 
Summit raised awareness of the severity of climate change and other environmental problems, which shifted the 
demand for environmental engagement by corporations worldwide. We argue that the exogenous shock of the 
Copenhagen Accord strengthened the societal demands and thus increased state-owned firms’ environmental 
engagement, because these firms should be more responsive.
15
  
We conduct a difference-in-differences (DiD) analysis by identifying state-owned firms after the passage of 
Copenhagen Accord (December 2009) as the treatment and estimating the regression: 
𝐸𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽0𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 2009𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1+ 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1+ 𝛽3𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1) 
+ 𝛽4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1+ 𝛽5𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1+ 𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1+ 𝛽7𝐿𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡)  + 𝛴 𝝆 ∗ 𝐼(𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗) 
+𝛴 𝜹 ∗ 𝐼(𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡) +𝜀𝑖,𝑡,                                                                                     (2) 
where Post 2009t is an indicator variable that equals one if year t is from 2010 onward and zero otherwise (to 
capture the effect of the Copenhagen Agreement signed in December 2009). The interaction term is used to test 
whether state-owned firms became more environmentally engaged after 2009, because of strengthened pressure 
from governments. We expect the coefficient estimate on the interaction term, β0, to be significantly positive.  To 
                                                          
14 The major milestone of the Summit was the passage of the Copenhagen Accord, which is a document that delegates at the 15th session of 
the Conference of Parties (COP 15) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change agreed to “take note of” at the final 
session on December 18, 2009. The Accord was drafted by the U.S. and a coalition of the BASIC countries (China, India and South 
Africa). It was intended to succeed to the Kyoto Protocol, which ended in 2012. Passage of the Copenhagen Accord was largely exogenous 
to corporate environmental engagement in the recent decade, because it was not a direct response to corporate environmental performance. 
15 Some people have criticized the Copenhagen Accord for not being legally binding. We argue that this feature is actually an advantage for 
our empirical setting, as it enables us to test corporations’ voluntary engagement (rather than strict compliance with regulations) in 
environmental issues. 
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ensure that estimation of Equation (2) is not affected by other economic factors, we restrict the sample period to a 
two-year window (2008-2011) or three-year window (2007-2012). For brevity, we report only the results based on 
ENVSCORE as the dependent variable. 
We report the DiD results in Table 5, which shows significantly positive estimates for the interaction term 
State_own × Post 2009. For example, in Column (2) for ENER in 2008-2011, the coefficient estimate of the 
interaction term is 1.92, with statistical significance at the 5% level. This suggests that, after passage of the 
Copenhagen Accord, state-owned firms increased their efforts toward emission reduction about 2% more than 
non-state-owned firms. Overall, the results in Table 5 suggest that state-owned firms are more responsive to 
environmental shocks, which provides additional support for our main hypothesis for several reasons. First, if our 
baseline results occur simply by chance, we should not expect to see a stronger effect of state ownership after 
2009. Second, if our baseline results are driven by other ownership types or by omitted variable bias, then such 
alternatives would need to be stronger after 2009 to explain the results in Table 5. Thus, a more convincing 
interpretation for our findings is that government ownership promotes environmental engagement, and the effect 
was strengthened after 2009 because the Copenhagen Accord pressed on all governments to act on climate 
change. 
3.3. In What Firms Does State Ownership Matter More for Environmental Engagement?  
We investigate a few potential channels behind the effects we have documented of state ownership on 
environmental engagement. More specifically, we focus on whether a firm is in the energy sector or is based in a 
country where environmental issues are stronger concerns. 
First, if state ownership works in the public interest in dealing with environmental externalities, the effect 
should be more pronounced in industries that play a substantial role in environmental issues, such as oil and gas. 
In Column (1) of Table 6, we test whether the state-ownership effect is stronger in firms in energy-related 
industries by interacting the State_own dummy with the dummy variable Oil & Gas that equals one if the firm is 
in the oil and gas industry. This is an industry where green initiatives may substantially reduce pollution and 
improve environmental quality. As in Table 6, the coefficient of Oil & Gas is significantly negative, which 
suggests that average firms in the energy industry fall short of engagement in environmental issues. More 
important, the coefficient estimate of the interaction term State_own × Oil & Gas is statistically significant at the 
5% level, suggesting a particularly strong positive relation between state ownership and environmental 
engagement variables among energy-related firms. This finding confirms that our baseline result reflects the 
public interest in dealing with environmental externalities. 
Second, if a country is highly energy dependent, the state may have a stronger incentive to engage in activities 
and technologies that improve its energy efficiency, leading to better environmental performance. We test whether 
the state-ownership effect is stronger in countries that are more energy dependent by interacting the State_own 
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dummy with a country-level energy security risk index. Data on country-level energy security risk are obtained 
from the International Index of Energy Security Risk of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Institute for 21st 
Century Energy (www.energyxxi.org). As in Column (2) of Table 6, the interaction term State_own × Energy 
security risk is positive and statistically significant, which indicates that a country’s natural resources are a driver 
of a state’s motivation for strong environmental engagement.  
Third, if a country is in conflict with its neighboring countries, its government may have stronger incentives 
to improve energy efficiency to counter potential instability in energy supply; neighboring countries may disrupt 
or cut the necessary energy supply sources. We test this by interacting the State_own dummy with a country-level 
neighboring country conflicts index. This is obtained from the Global Conflict Risk Index (GCRI) of the 
European Commission’s Joint Research Center. Column (3) of Table 6 shows that the interaction term State_own 
× Neighboring countries conflict is positive and statistically significant, which supports our hypothesis that a 
country’s conflicts risk is a driver of the state-ownership effect on environmental engagement. 
Lastly, if a country’s ruling party is more progressive in political orientation, its government may pursue a 
stronger role in controlling economic life (Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005)) and environmental issues. We test 
this by interacting the State_own dummy with a political variable that takes a value of 1, 2, or 3 if the government 
is right, center, or left. Data on ruling parties’ political orientation are obtained from the World Bank’s Database 
of Political Institutions (DPI) and vary across countries and years. Column (4) of Table 6 shows that the 
coefficient of the interaction term State_own × Political orientation is statistically insignificant. Therefore, a 
government’s political orientation is not likely the key driver of state-owned firms’ engagement in environmental 
issues. 
Overall, Table 6 suggests that we can attribute the influence of state ownership on firms’ environmental 
engagement to the substantial role of energy-related firms in environmental issues and government concerns with 
respect to stable energy supply, and is not driven by a country’s political leaning. 
Another channel that may affect the association between state ownership and environmental engagement 
relates to economic development and geography. According to The Economist (2010, 2014) and Musacchio and 
Lazzarini (2014), the resurgence of Leviathan Inc. is particularly strong in emerging economies such as Brazil or 
China. These markets are more likely to suffer from a scarcity of long-term capital to fund promising projects 
such as environment-related expenditures, making government intervention more necessary. Therefore, we 
investigate cross-regional variation in the state-ownership effects. In Panel A of Table 7, we report results from 
estimation of Equation (1) in emerging countries in Column (1) and developed countries in Columns (2).
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 We 
find a significantly positive coefficient of state ownership in the subsample of emerging countries and a positive 
                                                          
16 Following the OECD and the MSCI Global Index, we define as developed countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Singapore, the U.K., and the US. All the rest of the countries are emerging economies.  
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but insignificant coefficient of state ownership in the subsample of developed countries. These findings suggest 
that the significantly positive effect of state ownership on environmental engagement exists mainly in emerging 
countries. 
In Panel B of Table 7, we report the results from estimation of Equation (1) in five geographic regions. We 
find that the state-ownership effects are mainly in the subsamples of Asia Pacific and Latin America. The 
coefficient estimates of state ownership are negative (although insignificant) in Africa and Middle East and in 
North America. Emerging countries may have to depend on state ownership to mitigate environmental 
externalities if these are inadequate institutional environments or necessary incentives in the private sector. 
3.4. Are Government Stakes Special?  
We conduct further tests to explore what is special about government ownership. We employ an alternative 
proxy of state ownership, compare state blockholdings to other types of blockholders, and explore further the 
different types of government stakes.     
We first consider an alternative proxy of state ownership and replace the binary variable State_own (where the 
ultimate owner is the central government, a state, or a public authority) with the continuous variable 
Government_held using data from Datastream to identify the percentage of free-floating shares held by the 
government, if those holdings exceed 5%. In Column (1) in Panel A of Table 8, we rerun the analysis using this 
alternative measure of state ownership. Our results still hold: Firms with greater state holdings score more highly 
in environmental performance. 
Second, we ask whether the effects we document above are unique to government ownership, or instead may 
just be related to the presence of any blockholder and not specific to stakes held by a government. In our baseline 
tests, we already control for institutional ownership or frequent blockholders in firms around the world. To further 
address this concern, we use data from Datastream on the percentage of total shares held by strategic blockholders. 
These include block holdings of 5% or more by foreign investors (Foreign holdings); by other (industrial) 
companies (Cross holdings); by pension funds (Pension fund held); by investment companies (Investment co 
held); by employees (Employee held); by other investors (Other holdings); and total holdings by all these 
blockholders (Strategic holdings). Data from Factset/Lionshares allow us to identify the percentage of all 
outstanding shares (traded or non-traded) owned by domestic institutional investors (Domestic inst. held) and by 
foreign institutional investors (Foreign inst. held) (see Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and Matos (2011) and Dyck, Lins, 
Roth, and Wagner (2016)). Panel A of Table 8 presents the regression results for each variable.
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 We find that 
almost all other types of blockholdings are either uncorrelated with environmental engagement (foreign holdings, 
cross holdings, other holdings, and domestic institutional holdings) or negatively correlated with environmental 
                                                          
17 Again, to save space, we present results for only ENVSCORE as the dependent variable. Results are similar using other sub-dimensional 
environmental scores as dependent variables. 
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engagement (pension fund holdings, investment company holdings, employee holdings, and strategic holdings). 
The only exception is a positive loading on foreign institutional ownership, which is consistent with findings in 
Dyck et al. (2016). Similar to those authors, we find that foreign institutional investors, especially those from 
developed countries with higher environmental standards, are concerned about environmental issues because of 
reputational concerns or moral pressure from their end investors. Nevertheless, we note that foreign institutional 
investors and governments are fairly independent investors with different objectives. Overall, the findings 
reported in Table 8 suggest that the influence of state ownership on environmental engagement is likely unique to 
government ownership and not driven by other types of block holdings. 
Third, we explore the role of different types of government stakes. Does the effect of state occur because a 
domestic (not foreign) government is the owner? Does it matter whether a company is held directly by the state or 
held through an investment by a sovereign wealth fund (such as the Norges Bank of Norway or Temasek of 
Singapore)? Answering these questions can shed further light on the mechanisms through which government 
ownership influences corporate environmental engagement. The public interest theory would argue that the effect 
happens through a direct ownership stake by a domestic state entity that cares more about public goods (local 
environmental protection). We test this by distinguishing between domestic and foreign state ownership. The 
results are reported in Panel B of Table 8, where the dependent variable in all columns is ENVSCORE. In Column 
(1), the dummy variable Domestic State_own equals 1 if the company’s ultimate owner is the domestic 
government as defined by Orbis, and 0 otherwise.
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 Its coefficient is positive and statistically significant, and 
similar in size to that in the baseline regressions (about 4%). In Columns (2) and (3), we interact the State_own 
dummy with a dummy variable Domestic_own, which takes a value of 1 if the company has a domestic ultimate 
owner defined by Orbis, and 0 otherwise. The difference between the two columns is that in Column (2) we run 
the regression on the subsample of developed countries, whereas in Column (3) subsample is of emerging 
countries. The coefficient of the interaction term State_own × Domestic_own is significant in emerging 
countries (Column 3) but not in developed countries (Column 2), which indicates that the role of state-owned 
companies in promoting environmental protection is stronger in emerging economies and through holdings by 
domestic governments. Finally, we test the difference between direct state ownership and ownership through 
investment by sovereign wealth funds. In Column (4) we include State_own and a dummy variable indicating 
whether the company is invested by a sovereign wealth fund (SWF), and find that the effect comes mostly from 
State_own rather than SWF, suggesting that it is direct state ownership that matters for corporate environmental 
engagement. This is consistent with the notion that SWFs are mainly concerned with financial returns, while 
domestic government may be more concerned about solving externalities and market failures with regard to 
environmental issues. 
                                                          
18 This is defined similarly to our main variable State_own, except that we require that the ultimate owner be the domestic government, 
rather than a state in general. The control group in this case consists of companies that are either owned by a foreign government or not 
owned by any government at all. 
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Overall, Table 8 provides evidence of the unique role of state ownership in environmental concerns. It also 
demonstrates that the influence of state ownership on corporate environmental engagement comes mainly through 
direct ownership stakes held by the domestic governments. Given that domestic governments are more likely in a 
position to deal with negative environmental externalities, the tests reported in Table 8 support a causal 
interpretation of our baseline findings. 
3.5. Alternative Measures of Environmental Engagement  
Finally, to triangulate our results based on the ASSET4 Environmental Score, we replace the dependent 
variable with two alternative measures of firm-level environmental engagement using another two widely-used 
ESG datasets with an academic focus: MSCI ESG Intangible Value Assessment (“MSCI”) and Sustainalytics 
ESG Ratings (“Sustainalytics”). We take the environment-related ratings from each database: the Environmental 
Pillar Score from MSCI (ranging between 0 and 10) and the Environmental Score from Sustainalytics (ranging 
between 0 and 100). Both ratings measure how well companies proactively manage the environmental issues that 
are the most material to their business and provide an assessment on companies’ ability to mitigate risks and 
capitalize on opportunities.
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 Similar to ASSET4, the ratings by these two alternative databases are also industry-
adjusted, that is, companies are rated on their environmental engagement (both voluntary initiatives and 
mandatory compliance) relative to their industry peers (a “best-of-sector” methodology to compare companies 
within a given sector to industry best practices) on a global scale, and they are also mostly the constituents of 
major global equity indices. The MSCI sample covers 1,625 companies and each company is given only one score 
on a scale of 0 to 10, based on its most recent year’s (i.e., 2016) environmental performance. The Sustainalytics 
data covers 8,060 companies over the years 2010-2017, and each company is scored on a scale of 0 to 100.  
We conduct cross-sectional ordinary least squared (OLS) estimations on these two alternative samples of 
environmental engagement because the MSCI data are cross-sectional in nature. The control variables are the 
same as before and are lagged by one year. To be consistent in test with the MSCI data, we take the average 
environmental score and control variables for each company over the sample period for the Sutainalytics data 
(which is a short panel). The results shown in Table 9 are consistent with our previous findings, the coefficient on 
State_own remains positive and statistically significant. The economic magnitudes are also comparable to our 
baseline results using ASSET4: on average, state-owned firms score 4-7% higher than non-state-owned firms, as 
                                                          
19  For Sustainalytics data, the assessment of a company’s environmental engagement is structured within four dimensions: (1) 
Preparedness, which refers to assessments of company management systems and policies designed to manage material environmental 
risks; (2) Disclosure, which refers to assessments of whether company reporting meets international best practice standards and is 
transparent with respect to most material ESG issues; (3) Quantitative Performance, which refers to assessments of company ESG 
performance based on quantitative metrics such as carbon intensity; (4) Qualitative Performance, which refers to assessments of 
company ESG performance based on the analysis of controversial incidents that the company may be involved in. Underlying each 
industry group template is a customized weight matrix designed to further highlight the key environmental issues faced by each sector, 
and companies are also assessed for their level of involvement in major controversies and the associated business risks they face from 




the coefficients of State_own are 0.712 and 3.592 for MSCI Environmental Pillar Score (ranging between 0 and 
10) and the Sustainalytics Environmental Score (ranging from 0 to 100), respectively. Given that the two 
alternative measures are compiled by different data providers, our consistent results suggest that the strong 
correlations between corporate environmental engagement and state ownership are not likely driven by the 
peculiarity of the ASSET4 data that may be hard-wired in the ratings. 
 
4. State Ownership and Shareholder Value, Social Responsibility, and Corporate Governance 
An important question is whether the state-ownership effects we document are unique to environmental 
sustainability, or whether state-owned firms are superior both in dealing with externalities and in maximizing 
shareholder value. Some authors find that state-owned firms care more about social issues such as employment 
and community engagement (Liang and Renneboog, 2017). Shleifer and Vishny (1998) argue that, due to 
incentive problems, state-owned firms may engage in rent-seeking activities at the cost of society at large. Others 
find that state-owned firms usually have weaker corporate governance and consequently poorer financial 
performance (e.g., Megginson, Nash, and Van Randenborgh (1994); Dewenter and Malatesta (2001); Megginson 
and Netter (2001); Bortolotti and Faccio (2009)). Musacchio, Lazzarini, and Aguilera (2015) argue that the new 
form of state ownership has mixed implications for governance and firm performance.   
In Table 10 we investigate the shareholder value implications of such environmental engagement by state-
owned firms. To do so, we first regress Tobin’s Q (measured by MTB, the market-to-book ratio of assets) on the 
interaction between state ownership and the various environment engagement scores in Column (1). The control 
variables are similar to those tested before, except that we do not include the market-to-book ratio on both sides of 
the equation. Several interesting observations can be made. First, the coefficient on State_own is statistically 
insignificant, suggesting that SOEs do not have higher (or lower) shareholder value. Second, ENVSCORE is 
positively and significantly correlated with Tobin’s Q, consistent with the “doing well by doing good” hypothesis 
(see Flammer (2015)) and empirical evidence that corporate environmental engagement is related to better firm 
performance and higher value (Dowell, Hart, and Yeung (2000)). Third, and more important, the interaction 
between state ownership and environmental scores is insignificant, suggesting that environmental engagement by 
state-owned firms is not associated with lower shareholder value.  
Column (2) of Table 10 reports the results from regressing firms’ forward five-year average ROA on the 
interaction between state ownership and engagement with environment. We again find an insignificant coefficient 
on State_own, consistent with the Tobin’s Q results. This suggests that state-owned firms do not underperform 
financially. On the other hand, ENVSCORE is positively and significantly associated with future ROA, suggesting 
that environmental engagement per se may enhance long-term profitability. Lastly, the interaction between state 
ownership and environmental scores is insignificant, supporting the argument that state-owned firms’ 
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environmental engagement does not sacrifice future profitability. Overall, Table 10 highlights that a greater 
engagement in environmental issues of state-owned companies does not come at a cost at shareholders, but may 
have welfare implications for society at large. 
We then examine state ownership in terms of the bigger picture of “ESG,” namely, how state-owned firms 
fare in terms of social issues and corporate governance. We address this question using the social and corporate 
governance pillar scores of ESG ratings from the ASSET4 database. We use two aggregate scores. The first 
measures a company’s overall commitment to social issues (SOCSCORE), or how firms care about customers, 
suppliers, employees, community, and human rights. The second measures corporate governance quality 
(CGVSCORE) or board functions and board structure, compensation policy for executives, integrated vision and 
strategy, and shareholder rights. In Figures IA.1 and IA.2 of the Internet Appendix we show the time series of the 
average social and corporate governance pillar scores. 
The evidence in Table 11 indicates that state-owned firms also engage more in social issues, as is evident by 
the coefficient on State_own in Column (1) (although significant only at the 10% level), but they do not have 
better corporate governance performance, as the coefficient on State_own is insignificant in Column (2). These 
results further confirm that state-owned firms may engage more in terms of non-financial issues and dealing with 
externalities, but they are no better (and no worse) in corporate governance. This echoes our results in Table 10 
that SOEs do not produce better shareholder value, and is consistent with the large literature on the positive link 
between good corporate governance and higher shareholder returns (e.g., Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003); 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009)). In our case, state-control does not result in superior corporate governance, 
hence greater returns to shareholders, but it has a positive effect on the welfare of society at large, without 
necessarily sacrificing shareholder interests. 
 
5. Conclusion  
The role of the state in organizing economic life has been a long debated topic. A major trend characterizing 
the beginning of the 21st century is the resurgence of state-owned enterprises (SOEs, or Leviathan Inc.), 
especially in emerging market economies. We have also seen increasing attention paid to global warming and 
sustainability issues. Governments can address market failures not just through taxation or subsidies and 
regulations, but also directly through providing public goods to society via state-owned firms. It is commonly 
thought, however, that governments can be captured, that they may lack the technical capacity to run firms, and 
that ultimately they cannot manage SOEs effectively.  
We examined the role of state ownership of publicly-listed companies in environmental issues around the 
world over the last decade to answer the question. We find that SOEs tend to be highly engaged in environmental 
issues. We do not find such a pattern for other block-owners in the private sector. The effect comes mainly from 
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direct domestic ownership stakes in local firms, rather than from holdings by foreign governments or sovereign 
wealth funds. We document that the role of SOEs in environmental engagement is more pronounced in energy 
firms and firms located in: 1) emerging economies; 2) countries lacking energy resources; and 3) countries in 
conflict with neighboring countries. Further supporting our results on the effect of SOEs on environmental 
engagement is the finding that they reacted more than non-state-owned firms to passage of the Copenhagen 
Accord in December 2009. Interestingly, state-owned firms are also more engaged with social issues, but they do 
not have better corporate governance performance. 
We believe these findings have policy implications. As economies worldwide embraced pro-market reforms 
in the last quarter of the 20th century, many prototypical SOEs were transformed. Privatization may have resulted 
in changes and in a reduction in their numbers, but it did not spell the end of state ownership of companies. Our 
findings show that modern SOEs have emerged to be more effective than their private counterparts in dealing 
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Appendix: List of Variables and Data Sources  
Variable  Description 
ENVSCORE The environmental pillar (ENVSCORE) measures a company’s impact on living and non-living natural systems, 
including the air, land, and water, as well as complete ecosystems. It reflects how well a company uses best 
management practices to avoid environmental risks and capitalize on environmental opportunities in order to 
generate long-term shareholder value. The environmental pillar is an equally weighted score of the sub-
dimensional scores: Emission Reduction, Product Innovation, and Resource Reduction. Source: Thomson Reuters 
ASSET4 database. 
ENRR Emission Reduction, measures a company’s management commitment to and effectiveness in reducing 
environmental emission in production and operational processes. It reflects a company’s capacity to reduce air 
emissions (greenhouse gases, F-gases, ozone-depleting substances, NOx, Sox, etc.), waste, hazardous waste, water 
discharges, and spills, or its impacts on biodiversity, and to partner with environmental organizations to reduce the 
environmental impact of the company in the local or broader community. Source: Thomson Reuters ASSET4 
database. 
ENPI Product Innovation measures a company’s management commitment to and effectiveness in supporting the 
research and development of eco-efficient products or services. It reflects a company’s capacity to reduce 
environmental costs and burdens for its customers, and thereby create new market opportunities through new 
environmental technologies and processes or eco-designed, dematerialized products with extended durability. 
Source: Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database. 
ENRR Resource Reduction measures a company’s management commitment to and effectiveness in achieving an 
efficient use of natural resources in the production process. It reflects a company’s capacity to reduce the use of 
materials, energy, or water, and to find more eco-efficient solutions by improving supply chain management. 
Source: Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database. 
SOCSCORE The social pillar measures a company’s capacity to generate trust and loyalty its workforce, customers, and 
society, through (SOCSCORE) its use of best management practices. It is a reflection of the company’s reputation 
and the health of its license to operate, which are key factors in determining its ability to generate long-term 
shareholder value. The social pillar is an equally weighted score of the sub-dimensional scores: Customer/ Product 
Responsibility, Society/ Human Rights, Workforce/ Diversity and Opportunity, Workforce/ Employment Quality, 
Workforce/ Health & Safety, Workforce/ Training & Development. Source: Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database. 
CGVSCORE The corporate governance pillar (CGVSCORE) measures a company’s systems and processes, which ensure that 
its board members and executives act in the best interests of its long-term shareholders. It reflects a company’s 
capacity, through its use of best management practices, to direct and control its rights and responsibilities through 
the creation of incentives, as well as checks and balances in order to generate long-term shareholder value. The 
corporate governance pillar is an equally weighted score of the sub-dimensional scores: Board of Directors/ Board 
Functions, Board of Directors/ Board Structure, Board of Directors/ Compensation Policy, Integration/ Vision and 




The Environmental Pillar Score includes the following issues: carbon emissions, product carbon footprint, energy 
efficiency, insuring climate change risk, water stress, biodiversity and land use, raw material sourcing, financing 
environmental impact, toxic emissions and waste, packaging material and waste, electronic waste, opportunities in 
clean tech, opportunities in green building, opportunities in renewable energy, etc. The data is then converted to a 
relative score, by allocating the company with the best performance within its industry sector in a given category a 
10, the top score, giving the company with the worst performance a 0, the lowest, and scoring the remainder pro-




The Sustainalytics Environmental Score addresses a broad range of macro-level environmental issues and trends 
that have a significant, and in some cases material, impact on industries and companies, creating both risks and 
opportunities for investors. The score is based on a company’s environmental engagement based on four 
dimensions: (1) Preparedness, which refers to assessments of company management systems and policies designed 
to manage material environmental risks; (2) Disclosure, which refers to assessments of whether company reporting 
meets international best practice standards and is transparent with respect to most material ESG issues; (3) 
Quantitative Performance, which refers to assessments of company ESG performance based on quantitative 
metrics such as carbon intensity; (4) Qualitative Performance – assessments of company ESG performance based 
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on the analysis of controversial incidents that the company may be involved in. Underlying each industry group 
template is a customized weight matrix designed to further highlight the key environmental issues faced by each 
sector, and companies are also assessed for their level of involvement in major controversies and the associated 
business risks they face from such involvement. The ratings are given on a scale of 0-100 using the “best-of-
sector” methodology to compare companies within a given sector to industry best practices. Source: Sustainalytics 
ESG Ratings. 
State_own A dummy variable that equals one if the ultimate owner is the state, the government, or a public authority, and 
zero otherwise. Ultimate owner is defined as the shareholder holding the percentage of direct voting rights, 
identified by following the path of uninterrupted control rights (at 25%) throughout the ownership pyramid. 
Source: Orbis. 
Domestic_own A dummy variable that equals one if the ultimate owner is from the same country of the firm, and zero otherwise. 
Ultimate owner is defined as the shareholder of direct voting rights owned by this shareholder who is identified by 
following the path of uninterrupted control rights (at 25%) throughout the ownership pyramid. Source: Orbis. 
Domestic 
state_own 
A dummy variable that equals one if the ultimate owner is the state, the government, or a public authority of the 
company’s country, and zero otherwise. Ultimate owner is defined as the shareholder direct voting rights owned 
by this shareholder who is identified by following the path of uninterrupted control rights (at 25%) throughout the 
ownership pyramid. Source: Orbis. 
SWF A dummy variable that equals one if the company has shares owned by a sovereign wealth fund (SWF), and zero 
otherwise. Source: Factset. 
Inst_own Holdings (end-of-year) by all institutions as a fraction of market capitalization. Source: FactSet/LionShares. 
Market-to-
book (MTB)  
Calculated as the ratio of the market value of total assets to the replacement value of total assets of the company 
(the sum of book value of equity and book value of liabilities), winsorized at the 5% level. Source: Datastream. 
Return on 
assets (ROA) 
Calculated as the ratio of net income to the book value of total assets of the company. Source: Datastream and 
Compustat. 
Firm size The logarithm of the company’s total assets. Source: Datastream and Compustat. 




GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by 
all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of 
the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and 
degradation of natural resources. Source: World Bank database. 
Government 
held 
The percentage of total shares in issue of holdings of 5% or more held by a government or government institution. 
Source: Datastream.  
Foreign 
holdings 
The percentage of total shares in holdings of 5% or more held by an institution domiciled in a country other than 




2005, this datatype was calculated as a separate strategic component. 
Since that date NOSHFR has represented the foreign held holdings of 5% or more included in the total strategic 
holdings datatype NOSHST. Source: Datastream. 
Cross 
holdings 
The percentage of total shares in holdings of 5% or more held by one company in another. Source: Datastream. 
Pension fund 
held 




The percentage of total shares in holdings of 5% or more held as long term strategic holdings by investment banks 
or institutions seeking a long term return. Note that holdings by Hedge Funds are not included. Source: 
Datastream. 
Employee held The percentage of total shares in holdings of 5% or more held by employees, or by those with a substantial 
position in a company that provides significant voting power at an annual general meeting, (typically family 




The percentage of total shares in holdings of 5% or more held strategically, and outside one of the above 
categories. Source: Datastream. 
Strategic 
holdings 
The percentage of total shares in holdings of 5% or more held strategically and not available to ordinary investors. 
Note that holdings of 5% or more held by hedge fund owners or investment advisor/hedge fund owners are 
regarded as very active, and not counted as strategic. Source: Datastream. 
Domestic inst. 
held 
Holdings (end-of-year) by institutions located in the same country where the stock is listed as a fraction of market 
capitalization. Source: FactSet/LionShares. 
Foreign inst. 
held 
Holdings (end-of-year) by institutions located in a different country from the country where the stock is listed as a 
fraction of market capitalization. Source: FactSet/LionShares. 
Energy 
security risk 
Scores for the country-level energy security risk are reported in relation to an average reference index measuring 
risks for OECD member countries. The OECD average risk index is calibrated to a 1980 base year figure of 1,000. 
It includes: (1) Global fuels, which measures the reliability and diversity of global reserves and supplies of oil, 
natural gas, and coal; (2) Fuel imports, which measure the exposure of national economies to unreliable and 
concentrated supplies of oil and natural gas, and coal; (3) Energy expenditures, which measures the magnitude of 
energy costs to national economies and the exposure of consumers to price shocks; (4) Price and market volatility, 
which measures the susceptibility of national economies to large swings in energy prices; (5) Energy use intensity, 
which measures energy use in relation to population and economic output; (6) Energy power sector, which 
measures indirectly the reliability of electricity generating capacity; (7) Transportation sector, which measures 
efficiency of energy use in the transport sector per unit of GDP and population; (8) Environmental, which 
measures the exposure of national economies to national and international greenhouse gas emission reduction 
mandates. Lower emissions of carbon dioxide from energy indicate a less of risk to energy security. Source: 





The neighboring country conflicts index is an index of the statistical risk of violent conflict in the next 1-4 years 
and is exclusively based on quantitative indicators from open sources. With the assumption that structural 
conditions in a country are linked to the occurrence of violent conflict, the GCRI collects 25 variables in 5 
dimensions (social, economic, security, political, geographic/environmental) and uses statistical regression models 
to calculate the probability and intensity of violent conflict. Source: Global Conflict Risk Index (GCRI) of the 
European Commission’s Joint Research Center (http://conflictrisk.jrc.ec.europa.eu/) 
Political 
orientation 
Political orientation of the Executive Branch, which measures party orientation with respect to economic policy, 
coded based on the description of the party in the sources, 1=Right; 3=Left; 2=Center. Right: Parties that are 
defined as conservative, Christian democratic, or right-wing.  Left: Parties that are defined as communist, socialist, 
social democratic, or left-wing. Center: Parties that are defined as centrist or when party position can best be 
described as centrist (e.g., party advocates strengthening private enterprise in a social-liberal context). Not 
described as centrist if competing factions “average out” to a centrist position (e.g., a party of “right-wing Muslims 
and Beijing-oriented Marxists”). 0: All cases that do not fit into category (i.e., party platform does not focus on 
economic issues, or there are competing wings), or no information. Source: Database of Political Institutions (DPI) 




Figure 1. Average State-ownership of Publicly-Listed Firms, Per Country 
This figure presents the rank of state-owned ratios of sample firms in each country. We require the firm-year to 
have non-missing values in the following variables (used in our regression analyses) to enter into our sample: 
ENVSCORE, State_own, institutional ownership, total assets, leverage, market-to-book ratio, ROA, and GDP per 





Figure 2. Average Proportion of State-owned Publicly-listed Firms, per Geographic Region 
and Year 
This figure presents the time series patterns of the ratios of state-owned public firms in the five 
different regions. The sample period is from 2004 to 2014. Panel A presents equal-weighted 
averages, in which we calculate the ratio of the number of state-owned firms among all public firms 
in a region in each year. Panel B shows value-weighted averages, in which we calculate the average 
ratios of state-owned firms among all public firms in a region in each year, weighted by the lagged 






Figure 3. Average ENVSCORE of Publicly-listed Firms, per Geographic Region and Year  
This figure presents the time series patterns of the average of environmental pillar scores 
(ENVSCORE) of public firms in the five geographical regions. The sample period is from 2004 to 
2014. Panel A presents equal-weighted averages, calculated with the simple average score of public 
firms in a region in each year. Panel B shows value-weighted scores, in which we calculate the 




 Table 1. Top-Ranked Global Companies 
This table describes state ownership (State_own), the environmental pillar scores (ENVSCORE and sub-categories 
scores: emission reduction ENER, product innovation ENPI, resource reduction ENRR), social pillar scores 
(SOCSCORE), and corporate governance pillar scores (CGVSCORE) of the top companies in the Forbes Global 2000 list 
for 2010. The top 10 SOEs are highlighted in boldface. Country abbreviations are described in Figure 1. 
 
Forbes Rank 2010 Country State_own ENVSCORE    SOCSCORE CGVSCORE 
    ENER ENPI ENRR   
1. JPMorgan Chase US 0 92.50 76.57 97.25 87.06 66.48 72.70 
2. General Electric US 0 95.06 94.53 97.69 95.05 90.78 94.49 
3. Bank of America US 0 77.54 48.28 86.94 80.64 67.41 82.06 
4. ExxonMobil US 0 94.19 92.48 94.75 93.17 91.67 86.78 
5. ICBC CN 1 87.86 72.09 95.19 85.65 78.27 78.98 
6. Banco Santander ES 0 93.21 92.03 87.77 93.30 95.23 89.16 
7. Wells Fargo US 0 91.92 93.11 88.13 84.08 59.39 82.47 
8. HSBC Holdings GB 0 93.40 93.63 87.41 93.41 86.73 84.91 
9. Royal Dutch Shell GB 0 89.69 79.54 89.40 92.34 78.23 87.56 
10. BP GB 0 89.86 89.45 75.50 89.25 87.12 83.28 
11. BNP Paribas FR 0 93.04 87.99 97.34 90.84 94.07 90.89 
12. PetroChina CN 1 57.50 64.25 15.44 75.30 81.13 19.74 
13. AT&T US 0 92.71 93.39 88.22 88.37 79.26 91.63 
14. Wal-Mart Stores US 0 86.55 69.81 71.89 88.95 75.46 94.06 
15. Berkshire Hathaway US 0 9.36 9.39 14.92 8.92 3.75 63.05 
16. Gazprom RU 1 81.95 91.28 53.11 79.10 76.46 6.99 
17. China Construction Bank CN 1 53.33 34.44 87.36 35.94 81.45 28.92 
18. Petrobras BR 1 91.67 90.93 84.42 88.34 93.80 34.01 
19. Total FR 0 89.70 77.73 87.75 83.24 83.63 65.24 
20. Chevron US 0 90.42 86.96 87.89 82.06 63.51 77.78 
21. Barclays GB 0 94.11 90.95 94.89 92.44 93.23 86.60 
22. Bank of China CN 1 79.61 37.93 95.50 88.15 82.44 49.77 
23. Allianz DE 0 93.50 93.66 88.13 93.40 93.40 78.88 
24. GDF Suez FR 1 90.06 92.34 88.28 78.89 95.71 76.96 
25. E ON DE 0 91.60 94.91 85.84 84.94 96.59 29.78 
26. Goldman Sachs US 0 92.12 78.15 87.37 93.51 53.77 74.37 
27. EDF Group FR 1 92.86 84.90 97.53 88.77 96.13 33.16 
28. AXA Group FR 0 93.39 85.18 95.44 93.31 94.37 82.90 
29. Lloyds GB 1 90.01 92.48 69.86 92.90 93.20 73.90 
30. Procter & Gamble US 0 94.69 92.76 97.41 93.50 92.54 81.51 
31. ENI IT 1 89.02 83.41 81.75 84.79 96.11 59.61 
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Table 2. Univariate Comparisons by Countries and Industries 
This table shows the averages of state ownership dummy (State_own), environmental pillar score (ENVSCORE, and sub-
scores: emission reduction ENER, product innovation ENPI and resource reduction ENRR), social pillar score (SOCSCORE), 
and corporate governance pillar score (CGVSCORE). *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. Country abbreviations are described in Figure 1.  
Panel A: Univariate Comparisons by Country 
Country 
Unique 
firm no. Obs State_own ENVSCORE State_own  
p-
value   ENER ENPI ENRR SOCSCORE CGVSCORE 
          =1 =0 (1 - 0)             
Total 4,009 28,890 0.066 51.51 57.40 51.13 0.00   51.45 49.16 51.72 52.07 53.36 
Emerging  3,558 0.248 49.20 50.94 48.58 0.00 ** 50.08 45.09 50.81 55.50 29.05 
Developed  25,332 0.040 51.83 62.94 51.41 0.00 *** 51.64 49.73 51.85 51.59 56.77 
AT 18 167 0.224 56.65 78.42 49.88 0.00 *** 54.98 55.25 53.66 56.08 33.32 
AU 350 1,855 0.012 36.91 47.95 36.80 0.07 * 40.15 34.69 39.16 39.30 63.42 
BE 27 237 0.072 56.50 64.10 56.13 0.34 
 
56.53 50.74 56.67 52.96 50.56 
BR 83 401 0.194 53.51 68.79 49.78 0.00 *** 52.50 46.89 56.34 64.11 27.24 
CA 265 1,635 0.018 39.01 33.81 38.98 0.27 
 
42.09 36.23 40.45 39.72 73.74 
CH 66 485 0.046 58.41 67.57 57.95 0.15 
 
57.15 54.97 58.25 56.61 47.10 
CL 20 115 0.211 40.19 39.81 40.54 0.91 
 
39.43 39.81 43.05 44.91 9.26 
CN 44 218 0.651 26.01 28.92 20.58 0.00 *** 24.39 38.47 23.13 25.40 24.59 
CO 7 26 0.600 48.77 59.70 33.50 0.02 ** 54.64 38.17 50.86 71.34 28.21 
CZ 3 22 0.364 51.00 61.92 44.76 0.00 *** 46.32 51.33 51.43 70.32 18.27 
DE 89 734 0.079 67.38 69.65 67.11 0.45 
 
64.75 65.09 66.30 68.48 34.59 




54.92 54.79 58.09 54.07 38.02 
EG 11 55 0.170 19.55 10.55 21.15 0.00 
 
21.37 25.05 20.67 27.24 8.64 
ES 55 420 0.024 71.90 87.47 71.75 0.00 *** 71.62 60.63 72.95 78.12 50.24 
FI 27 244 0.169 76.11 88.02 73.94 0.00 *** 69.22 78.39 71.03 70.35 60.87 
FR 99 901 0.116 76.93 79.53 76.67 0.24 
 
74.56 70.22 76.66 78.17 55.07 
GB 361 2,893 0.020 60.14 63.34 60.10 0.39 
 
62.80 48.16 62.88 63.31 73.89 
GR 22 192 0.287 50.25 69.69 42.92 0.00 *** 53.39 37.45 55.32 50.69 17.72 
HK 142 920 0.185 34.69 40.49 33.78 0.00 *** 33.12 36.85 37.07 35.98 36.48 
HU 4 22 0.227 75.69 35.23 87.58 0.00 
 
76.63 70.86 71.43 78.51 41.16 
ID 31 139 0.477 46.41 46.58 46.82 0.96 
 
51.94 37.26 48.70 62.82 26.03 
IE 14 117 0.103 44.03 72.69 40.76 0.00 *** 45.64 41.01 45.12 36.74 64.48 




37.24 40.99 49.35 45.73 37.17 
IN 75 362 0.218 54.98 52.61 55.62 0.44 
 
54.42 48.83 59.16 58.84 29.11 
IT 48 426 0.231 55.00 81.41 46.84 0.00 *** 53.93 52.84 56.28 64.23 43.97 
JP 416 3,939 0.016 62.23 70.17 62.12 0.03 ** 61.94 63.09 57.26 47.32 11.96 
KR 109 564 0.075 61.73 65.77 61.34 0.31 
 
61.18 63.98 56.14 57.05 13.79 




52.85 57.76 60.94 50.93 58.92 
MA 3 19 0.056 27.30 54.56 23.33 - 
 
25.57 27.54 33.38 54.64 5.45 




45.33 34.56 47.50 45.06 13.16 
MY 44 207 0.490 40.12 51.97 29.13 0.00 *** 44.71 37.32 40.53 49.12 46.94 
NL 37 286 0.017 69.67 85.72 69.38 0.00 *** 67.06 63.14 70.53 77.46 64.51 
NO 18 174 0.293 66.21 85.57 58.19 0.00 *** 63.98 64.62 61.74 69.81 63.62 
NZ 9 65 0.154 44.31 76.07 38.54 0.00 *** 43.31 45.98 41.67 41.47 62.47 




41.28 18.82 33.43 31.99 51.66 
PH 14 63 0.164 44.86 42.04 46.01 0.68 
 
42.42 43.30 48.75 45.31 28.78 
PL 26 128 0.457 35.39 44.60 27.94 0.00 *** 38.78 34.78 34.85 42.30 23.24 
PT 12 103 0.140 67.44 78.67 65.14 0.04 ** 69.26 56.18 67.15 76.88 56.78 
RU 34 187 0.384 46.48 56.83 40.14 0.00 *** 49.90 34.90 52.53 54.68 28.74 
SE 50 454 0.047 67.71 82.53 66.92 0.00 *** 64.58 66.35 64.50 64.94 54.29 
SG 49 414 0.380 36.98 45.66 32.19 0.00 *** 37.82 35.14 40.67 40.79 43.78 
TH 30 136 0.415 49.30 68.88 35.19 0.00 *** 48.04 47.37 50.58 59.71 45.53 
TR 24 135 0.250 51.04 34.88 55.89 0.00 
 
51.49 51.33 49.65 55.79 22.47 
US 1086 8,536 0.003 44.23 19.42 44.31 0.00 
 
42.95 45.00 44.82 47.61 74.15 




Table 2. (continued) 
 
Panel B: Univariate Comparisons by Major Industry 
Industry Obs. State_own ENVSCORE  SOCSCORE CGVSCORE 






(1 - 0) 
  Basic Materials 3,015 0.056 55.58 59.84 55.40 0.07 53.39 54.89 
Consumer Goods 3,370 0.019 61.55 47.15 61.90 0.00 57.76 46.95 
Consumer Services 3,992 0.023 41.05 52.56 40.79 0.00 46.35 53.55 
Financials 5,059 0.069 43.23 46.36 43.04 0.06 46.02 49.99 
Health Care 1,633 0.010 43.79 20.76 44.06 0.00 50.63 55.82 
Industrials 5,610 0.053 59.08 53.83 59.38 0.00 55.40 52.47 
Oil & Gas 2,061 0.126 45.48 64.61 42.69 0.00 48.52 63.62 
Technology 1,960 0.021 51.69 63.00 51.46 0.03 51.53 58.82 
Telecommunications 771 0.317 55.43 63.37 51.95 0.00 62.53 52.13 
Utilities 1405 0.256 63.53 64.80 63.32 0.36 62.40 55.66 







Table 3. Summary Statistics 
Panel A presents summary statistics for variables in the sample period 2004-2014. The main variables of interest 
include state ownership dummy (State_own), environmental pillar score (ENVSCORE, and sub-scores: emission 
reduction ENER, product innovation ENPI and resource reduction ENRR) social pillar score (SOCSCORE) and 
corporate governance pillar score (CGVSCORE). Variables and data sources are described in the Appendix. All control 
variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles. Summary statistics in Panel A include mean, standard deviation 
(S.D.), minimum (Min), first quartile (0.25), median (Mdn), third percentile (0.75), and maximum (Max). Panel B 
presents Pearson correlation coefficients for all variables. The sample period is 2004-2014. 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Obs Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Mdn 0.75 Max 
State_own 28,890 0.06 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
ENVSCORE 28,890 51.51 31.96 8.48 18.00 51.19 85.17 97.50 
ENER 28,890 51.45 32.00 7.29 18.46 50.34 85.45 98.04 
ENPI 28,890 49.16 31.21 8.35 19.30 35.78 82.49 99.68 
ENRR 28,890 51.72 31.99 6.31 18.20 54.58 84.48 97.69 
SOCSCORE 28,890 52.07 30.59 3.43 22.43 52.81 82.37 98.88 
CGVSCORE 28,881 53.36 30.06 1.09 24.21 61.29 79.71 97.55 
Inst_own 28,890 0.39 0.31 0.02 0.14 0.28 0.68 0.96 
Ln(Assets) 28,890 15.57 1.53 11.81 14.54 15.49 16.63 18.31 
Leverage 28,890 23.46 16.83 0.00 9.34 22.21 34.88 59.54 
MTB 28,890 2.48 1.83 0.54 1.19 1.89 3.11 7.60 
ROA 28,890 6.13 6.27 -7.55 2.05 5.39 9.55 20.39 
Ln(GDP) 28,890 10.51 0.59 8.05 10.50 10.70 10.82 10.96 
 
Panel B: Correlation Coefficients 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) State_own 1             
(2) ENVSCORE 0.049 1 
          
 
(3) ENER 0.062 0.925 1 
         
 
(4) ENPI 0.016 0.825 0.638 1 
        
 
(5) ENRR 0.048 0.922 0.838 0.626 1 
       
 
(6) SOCSCORE 0.085 0.781 0.756 0.568 0.772 1 
      
 
(7) CGVSCORE -0.103 0.170 0.177 0.068 0.204 0.295 1 
     
 
(8) Inst_own -0.198 -0.094 -0.116 -0.062 -0.077 -0.025 0.560 1 
    
 
(9) Ln(Assets) 0.125 0.399 0.381 0.326 0.374 0.398 0.031 0.030 1 
   
 
(10) Leverage 0.039 0.102 0.112 0.065 0.088 0.074 0.007 -0.030 0.190 1 
  
 
(11) MTB -0.054 -0.080 -0.090 -0.079 -0.046 0.002 0.136 0.177 -0.260 -0.047 1 
 
 
(12) ROA 0.002 -0.030 -0.031 -0.051 -0.002 0.040 0.078 0.104 -0.225 -0.150 0.457 1  




 Table 4. Baseline Regressions 
This table reports the regression results from regressing environmental pillar score (ENVSCORE, and sub-scores) on a state 
ownership dummy (State_own), other control variables, country fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Control variables include the 
ratio of institutional ownership (Inst_own), total assets in logarithm (Ln(Assets)), Leverage, market-to-book ratio (MTB), return on 





State_own and other control variables (except Ln(GDP)) are lagged by one year.  The sample period is 2004-2014. Robust standard 
errors are clustered at the firm-level and reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable: ENVSCORE ENVSCORE ENER ENER ENPI ENPI ENRR ENRR 
                  
State_own 3.991*** 2.507* 4.385*** 2.857** 2.606 1.306 4.703*** 2.702* 
 







































































































         Observations 28,890 28,890 28,890 28,890 28,890 28,890 28,890 28,890 
Number of firm_id 4,009 4,009 4,009 4,009 4,009 4,009 4,009 4,009 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table 5. Identification Test Based on the 2009 Copenhagen Agreement 
This table reports the regression results from regressing environmental pillar score (ENVSCORE) in 
year t, interacted with an indicator variable Post 2009 that equals one if year t-1 is larger than or 
equal to 2010 and zero otherwise (to capture the effect of the Copenhagen Agreement signed in 
December 2009), on state ownership dummy (State_own) in year t-1, control variables, country fixed 
effects, and year fixed effects. Control variables are included in the regressions, but estimated 
coefficients are not shown. Control variables include the ratio of institutional ownership (Inst_own), 
total assets in logarithm (Ln(Assets)), Leverage, market-to-book ratio (MTB), return on assets (ROA), 





percentiles. All control variables are in year t-1 (except Ln(GDP) that is in year t). The sample period 
is 2008-2011 in Panel A (the pre-event period is 2008-2009 and the post-event period is 2010-2011) 
and 2007-2012 in Panel B (the pre-event period is 2007-2009 and the post-event period is 2010-
2012). Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm-level and reported in parentheses. ***, **, and 
* denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. 
 
  
2-year window  
(2008-2011)   
3-year window  
(2007-2012) 
 
  (1)  
 
 (2)   
       
 
     
State_own × Post 2009   2.081**  
 
 2.136**   
 
  (0.859)  
 
 (0.954)   
State_own   2.073  
 
 1.798   
 
  (1.375)  
 
 (1.309)   
Inst_own   3.964*  
 
 2.342   
 
  (2.076)  
 
 (1.815)   
Ln(Assets)   7.332***  
 
 6.468***   
 
  (0.282)  
 
 (0.289)   
Leverage   -0.0163  
 
 -0.00263   
 
  (0.0182)  
 
 (0.0164)   
MTB   0.267**  
 
 0.166   
 
  (0.135)  
 
 (0.120)   
ROA   0.0398  
 
 0.0242   
 
  (0.0279)  
 
 (0.0235)   
Ln(GDP)   2.946  
 
 3.231*   
 
  (2.457)  
 
 (1.678)   
 
    
 
    
Observations   12,612  
 
 18,480   
Number of firms   3,648  
 
 3,833   
Country FE   Yes  
 
 Yes   




 Table 6. Channels  
This table reports the regression results from regressing environmental pillar score (ENVSCORE) on 
lagged state ownership dummy (State_own), condition variables, interaction term of State_own and 
conditional variables, other control variables, country fixed effects, and year fixed effects. 
Conditional variables include Oil & Gas (a firm-level dummy indicator), Energy security risk is the 
country-level index on energy security risk as assessed by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
Neighboring countries conflict is the country-level variable nb_is in Global Conflict Risk Index 
(GCRI), and political orientation as the variable EXECRLC in the Database of Political Institutions. 
Political orientation takes a value of 1, 2, or 3 if the government is right, central, and left. Control 
variables are included in the regressions but estimated coefficients are not shown. All control 




 percentiles. State_own and other control variables (except 
Ln(GDP)) are lagged by one year. We omit the coefficients of the control variables for brevity. The 
sample period is 2004-2014. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm-level and reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
         
State_own 1.720 1.438 3.524** 3.175** 
 
(1.475) (1.828) (1.681) (1.544) 
Oil & Gas -3.859***    
 (1.454)    
State_own × Oil & Gas 10.90**    
 (5.406)    
















 State_own × Neighboring 
























   Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 28,890 24,819 21,493 27,970 
Number of firms 4,009 3,826 3,688 3,867 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table 7. Regressions by Economic Development and Regions 
This table reports the regression results from regressing environmental pillar score (ENVSCORE) on state 
ownership dummy (State_own), other control variables, country fixed effects, and year fixed effects for the 
sub-sample of firms: located in emerging and developed markets (Panel A) and in each of five regions. 





 percentiles. State_own and other control variables (except Ln(GDP)) are lagged by one year. The 
sample period is 2004-2014. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm-level and reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. 
 







  State_own 3.976** 1.592 
 
(1.806) (1.937) 
   Observations 3,558 25,332 
Number of firms 730 3,279 
Control variables Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Panel B. By Region 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Region Africa & 
Middle East 
Asia Pacific Europe Latin America North America 
            
State_own -0.984 5.238** 0.283 6.851* -3.900 
 
(5.236) (2.383) (2.152) (3.805) (3.719) 
      Observations 736 8,882 8,437 664 10,171 
Number of firms 173 1,313 1,037 135 1,351 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




 Table 8. Alternative Measures of State Ownership and Other Types of Ownership 
This table reports the regression results from regressing environmental pillar score (ENVSCORE) on the variables for other ownership 
types, other control variables, country fixed effects, and year fixed effects. In Panel A, the state ownership (Government_held) capturing 
the percentage of free-float shares held by the government if they are above 5% threshold as measured by Datastream. Proxies for other 
block-ownership types include the ratios of floating shares owned by foreign investors (Foreign holdings), by other corporations (Cross 
holdings), by pension funds (Pension fund held), by investment companies (Investment co held), by employees (Employee held), by other 
investors (Other holdings), by strategic investors (Strategic holdings), and the ratios of shares owned by domestic institutional investors 
(Domestic inst. held) and by foreign institutional investors (Foreign inst. held). Control variables are included in the regressions but 
estimated coefficients are not shown. Control variables include the ratio of institutional ownership (Inst_own), total assets in logarithm 
(Ln(Assets)), Leverage, market-to-book ratio (MTB), return on assets (ROA), and GDP per capita in logarithm (Ln(GDP)). All control 




 percentiles. The variables for other ownership types and control variables (except Ln(GDP)) are 
lagged by one year. When we use domestic and foreign institutional investors as explanatory variables, we do not include Inst_own as a 
control variable in regressions. We omit the coefficients of the control variables for brevity. In Panel B, Domestic State_own is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the ultimate owner is the state of the company’s country defined by Orbis and zero otherwise. State_own is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the ultimate owner is the state defined by Orbis and zero otherwise. Domestic_own is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the ultimate owner is an entity in the company’s country defined by Orbis and zero otherwise. SWF is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the firm has at least one sovereign wealth fund investor defined by Factset/LionShares. The sample period is 2004-2014. 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm-level and reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A. Government versus Other Types of Block-owners 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
 
         Government_held 0.063**          
 (0.027)          
Foreign holdings  0.0017 
        
 
 (1.488) 
        Cross holdings  
 
-0.007 





       Pension fund held  
  
-0.314*** 





      Investment co held  
   
-0.038** 
     
 
 
   
(0.016) 
     Employee held  
    
-0.097*** 
    
 
 
    
(0.018) 
    Other holdings  
     
0.002 
   
 
 
     
(0.031) 
   Strategic holdings  





      
(0.010) 
  Domestic inst. held  





       
(2.310) 
 Foreign inst. held  








         Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 29,721 28,659 28,724 28,724 28,724 28,724 28,724 28,724 28,890 28,890 
Number of firms 4,174 4,004 4,006 4,006 4,006 4,006 4,006 4,006 4,009 4,009 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 8. Alternative Measures of State Ownership and Other Types of Ownership 
(continued) 
 
Panel B. Different Forms of State Ownership 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Domestic State_own 4.056** 
   
 
(1.896) 
   State_own  -0.310 0.560 2.502* 
 
 (2.790) (2.811) (1.411) 
Domestic_own  0.736 -7.310*** 
 
 
 (1.083) (2.279) 
 State_own × Domestic_own  3.845 6.812* 
 
 
 (3.807) (3.696) 







Observations 28,890 25,124 3,766 28,890 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 











Table 9. Alternative Measures of Environmental Engagement 
This table reports the results from regressing the environmental scores using two alternative 
environmental engagement measures—the Environmental Pillar Score from MSCI and the 
Environmental Score from Sustainalytics—on a state ownership dummy (State_own), other control 
variables and country fixed effects using OLS. Control variables include the ratio of institutional 
ownership (Inst_own), total assets in logarithm (Ln(Assets)), Leverage, market-to-book ratio (MTB), 
return on assets (ROA), and GDP per capita in logarithm (Ln(GDP)). All control variables are 




 percentiles. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country-level and 









   
State_own 0.712** 3.592*** 
 
(0.332) (1.324) 
Inst_own -0.375 4.825*** 
 
(0.400) (1.255) 
Ln(Assets) 0.343*** 2.602*** 
 
(0.0580) (0.305) 
Leverage 0.139* -8.877*** 
 
(0.0801) (1.958) 
MTB 0.426 0.953 
 
(0.335) (0.602) 
ROA 0.0658*** 0.0961 
 
(0.0157) (0.106) 
Ln(GDP) 41.73 -0.664 
 
(115.2) (4.094) 
Constant -457.4 24.36 
 
(1,260) (43.83) 
   
Observations 1,383 3,690 
R-squared 0.119 0.240 
Country FE Yes Yes 







Table 10. Shareholder Value and Firm Performance 
 
This table reports the regression results from regressing current Tobin’s Q (or Market-to-Book ratio of 




 percentiles, on state 
ownership dummy (State_own), environmental pillar score (ENVSCORE), the interaction effect, other 
control variables, country fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Control variables are defined in the 




 percentiles. State_own and other 
control variables (except Ln(GDP)) are lagged by one year. The sample period is 2004-2014. Robust 
standard errors are clustered at the firm-level and reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote p<0.01, 
p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) 
Dependent variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 5-year ROA 
   
State_own -0.0088 0.310 
 
(0.0993) (0.499) 
ENVSCORE 0.0024*** 0.0046*** 
 
(0.0006) (0.0016) 
State_own × ENVSCORE -0.0015 -0.0043 
 
(0.0014) (0.0053) 
Inst_own 0.588*** -0.0293 
 
(0.149) (0.431) 
Ln(Assets) -0.360*** -1.029*** 
 
(0.0200) (0.078) 
Leverage 0.0035** 0.0161*** 
 
(0.0014) (0.0042) 
ROA 0.0495*** 0.0414*** 
 
-0.0029 (0.0078) 





Observations 26,163 11,969 
Number of firm_id 3,954 2,696 
Country FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 





Table 11. Social and Corporate Governance Performance 
This table reports the regression results from regressing social pillar score (SOCSCORE) and 
corporate governance pillar score (CGVSCORE) on state ownership dummy (State_own), other 
control variables, country fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Control variables include total assets 
in logarithm (Ln(Assets)), Leverage, market-to-book ratio (MTB), return on assets (ROA), and GDP 





percentiles. State_own and other control variables (except Ln(GDP)) are lagged by one year. The 
sample period is 2004-2014. ***, **, and * denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) 
Dependent variable: SOCSCORE CGVSCORE 
      
State_own 2.233* 0.917 
 
(1.284) (1.099) 
Inst_own 4.856*** 11.59*** 
 
(1.753) (1.434) 
Ln(assets) 6.690*** 3.330*** 
 
(0.303) (0.191) 
Leverage -0.0176 0.0116 
 
(0.0164) (0.0120) 
MTB 0.364*** 0.108 
 
(0.103) (0.0872) 
ROA 0.117*** 0.0129 
 
(0.0252) (0.0213) 
Ln(GDP) 5.139*** 5.827*** 
 
(1.691) (1.440) 
   Observations 28,890 28,881 
Number of firms 4,009 4,009 
Country FE Yes Yes 
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Figure IA.1 Average SOCSCORE of Publicly-listed Firms, per Geographic Regions and Years  
This figure presents the time series patterns of the average of social pillar scores (SOCSCORE) of 
public firms in the five geographical regions. The sample period is from 2004 to 2014. Panel A 
presents equal-weighted averages, calculated with the simple average score of public firms in a 
region in each year. Panel B shows value-weighted scores, in which we calculate the average scores 







Figure IA.2 Average CGVSCORE of Publicly-listed Firms, per Geographic Regions and Years  
This figure presents the time series patterns of the average of environmental pillar scores 
(CGVSCORE) of public firms in the five geographical regions. The sample period is from 2004 to 
2014. Panel A presents equal-weighted averages, calculated with the simple average score of public 
firms in a region in each year. Panel B shows value-weighted scores, in which we calculate the 





Table IA.1. Data Distribution Across Years 
This table presents the number of firm-year observations with available data on state ownership dummy 
(State_own), environmental pillar score (ENVSCORE and sub-scores: emission reduction ENER, product 
innovation ENPI, resource reduction ENRR) across the sample years (2002-2014). 
Year 




2002 4,589 955 961 961 961 0 
2003 4,590 966 972 972 972 0 
2004 4,592 1,819 1,827 1,827 1,827 1,463 
2005 4,592 2,235 2,244 2,244 2,244 1,829 
2006 4,567 2,248 2,257 2,257 2,257 1,858 
2007 4,557 2,425 2,436 2,436 2,436 2,005 
2008 4,546 2,918 2,929 2,929 2,929 2,395 
2009 4,536 3,347 3,360 3,360 3,360 2,764 
2010 4,523 3,958 3,978 3,978 3,978 3,174 
2011 4,496 4,048 4,070 4,070 4,070 3,270 
2012 4,472 4,128 4,150 4,150 4,150 3,404 
2013 4,410 4,225 4,246 4,246 4,246 3,473 
2014 4,278 4,130 4,131 4,131 4,131 3,255 
Total 58,748 37,402 37,561 37,561 37,561 28,890 
 













Table IA.2. Comparisons by Countries 
In this table, we present the averages of state ownership dummy (State_own), environmental pillar score (ENVSCORE and sub-scores: 
emission reduction ENER, product innovation ENPI, resource reduction ENRR), social pillar score (SOCSCORE), and corporate governance 
pillar score (CGVSCORE). We also conduct t-tests for the difference in averages across state-owned and non-state-owned firms and report the 
p-value based on unequal variance. In Morocco (MA), we only have one observation in State_won =1 and the p-value cannot be calculated. 
Country Obs State_own ENVSCORE ENVSCORE ENVSCORE p-value ENER ENER ENER p-value 
   
All State_own=1 State_own=0 (1 - 0) All State_own=1 State_own=0 (1 - 0) 
Total 28,890 0.066 51.51 57.40 51.13 0.00 51.45 58.81 50.96 0.00 
AT 167 0.224 56.65 78.42 49.88 0.00 54.98 80.90 47.12 0.00 
AU 1,855 0.012 36.91 47.95 36.80 0.07 40.15 51.70 40.01 0.04 
BE 237 0.072 56.50 64.10 56.13 0.34 56.53 61.02 56.39 0.61 
BR 401 0.194 53.51 68.79 49.78 0.00 52.50 65.42 49.26 0.00 
CA 1,635 0.018 39.01 33.81 38.98 0.27 42.09 44.06 41.93 0.68 
CH 485 0.046 58.41 67.57 57.95 0.15 57.15 69.85 56.54 0.02 
CL 115 0.211 40.19 39.81 40.54 0.91 39.43 42.18 38.93 0.61 
CN 218 0.651 26.01 28.92 20.58 0.00 24.39 28.61 16.49 0.00 
CO 26 0.600 48.77 59.70 33.50 0.02 54.64 64.40 43.08 0.08 
CZ 22 0.364 51.00 61.92 44.76 0.00 46.32 86.10 23.59 0.00 
DE 734 0.079 67.38 69.65 67.11 0.45 64.75 68.73 64.40 0.25 







 EG 55 0.170 19.55 10.55 21.15 0.00 21.37 11.33 23.11 0.00 
ES 420 0.024 71.90 87.47 71.75 0.00 71.62 86.56 71.44 0.01 
FI 244 0.169 76.11 88.02 73.94 0.00 69.22 88.12 65.66 0.00 
FR 901 0.116 76.93 79.53 76.67 0.24 74.56 79.25 73.99 0.03 
GB 2,893 0.020 60.14 63.34 60.10 0.39 62.80 69.50 62.67 0.08 
GR 192 0.287 50.25 69.69 42.92 0.00 53.39 74.83 45.21 0.00 
HK 920 0.185 34.69 40.49 33.78 0.00 33.12 37.89 32.49 0.02 
HU 22 0.227 75.69 35.23 87.58 0.00 76.63 51.58 84.00 0.00 
ID 139 0.477 46.41 46.58 46.82 0.96 51.94 53.08 51.80 0.79 
IE 117 0.103 44.03 72.69 40.76 0.00 45.64 71.13 42.73 0.00 







 IN 362 0.218 54.98 52.61 55.62 0.44 54.42 55.70 54.15 0.71 
IT 426 0.231 55.00 81.41 46.84 0.00 53.93 81.50 45.42 0.00 
JP 3,939 0.016 62.23 70.17 62.12 0.03 61.94 72.24 61.80 0.00 
KR 564 0.075 61.73 65.77 61.34 0.31 61.18 69.18 60.43 0.06 







 MA 19 0.056 27.30 54.56 23.33 - 25.57 61.80 23.06 - 







 MY 207 0.490 40.12 51.97 29.13 0.00 44.71 54.10 35.94 0.00 
NL 286 0.017 69.67 85.72 69.38 0.00 67.06 68.86 67.02 0.86 
NO 174 0.293 66.21 85.57 58.19 0.00 63.98 82.11 56.47 0.00 
NZ 65 0.154 44.31 76.07 38.54 0.00 43.31 71.02 38.27 0.00 







 PH 63 0.164 44.86 42.04 46.01 0.68 42.42 48.10 41.42 0.57 
PL 128 0.457 35.39 44.60 27.94 0.00 38.78 50.98 28.92 0.00 
PT 103 0.140 67.44 78.67 65.14 0.04 69.26 84.03 66.12 0.02 
RU 187 0.384 46.48 56.83 40.14 0.00 49.90 57.82 45.11 0.00 
SE 454 0.047 67.71 82.53 66.92 0.00 64.58 83.88 63.57 0.00 
SG 414 0.380 36.98 45.66 32.19 0.00 37.82 46.77 32.87 0.00 
TH 136 0.415 49.30 68.88 35.19 0.00 48.04 73.11 30.53 0.00 
TR 135 0.250 51.04 34.88 55.89 0.00 51.49 37.08 55.55 0.00 
US 8,536 0.003 44.23 19.42 44.31 0.00 42.95 24.79 43.00 0.00 
ZA 445 0.058 53.33 59.25 52.54 0.14 55.27 56.69 54.86 0.74 
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Table IA.2. (continued) 
Country ENPI ENPI ENPI p-value ENRR ENRR ENRR p-value 
  All State_own=1 State_own=0 (1 - 0) All State_own=1 State_own=0 (1 - 0) 
Total 49.16 51.16 49.07 0.00 51.72 57.41 51.34 0.00 
AT 55.25 67.03 51.33 0.00 53.66 74.65 47.16 0.00 
AU 34.69 33.59 34.74 0.85 39.16 60.32 38.92 0.00 
BE 50.74 61.85 50.04 0.09 56.67 64.84 56.25 0.32 
BR 46.89 56.61 44.57 0.00 56.34 71.56 52.67 0.00 
CA 36.23 27.63 36.35 0.02 40.45 34.56 40.39 0.24 
CH 54.97 65.89 54.39 0.08 58.25 62.62 58.05 0.54 
CL 39.81 42.56 39.30 0.61 43.05 37.62 44.63 0.27 
CN 38.47 37.28 40.69 0.37 23.13 27.40 15.14 0.00 
CO 38.17 46.24 28.07 0.05 50.86 60.28 34.02 0.02 
CZ 51.33 33.56 61.49 0.00 51.43 53.90 50.02 0.54 








 EG 25.05 18.63 26.66 0.00 20.67 10.07 22.22 0.00 
ES 60.63 85.49 60.20 0.00 72.95 78.94 73.07 0.09 
FI 78.39 84.05 77.30 0.05 71.03 77.77 69.92 0.02 
FR 70.22 71.47 70.19 0.68 76.66 77.95 76.52 0.55 
GB 48.16 45.96 48.26 0.57 62.88 67.62 62.78 0.20 
GR 37.45 45.89 34.21 0.01 55.32 76.57 47.39 0.00 
HK 36.85 42.61 35.57 0.00 37.07 42.58 36.35 0.01 
HU 70.86 28.00 83.46 0.00 71.43 34.58 82.27 0.00 
ID 37.26 37.58 36.66 0.84 48.70 46.25 51.62 0.26 








 IN 48.83 42.24 50.62 0.02 59.16 55.29 60.21 0.20 
IT 52.84 73.52 46.38 0.00 56.28 77.78 49.66 0.00 
JP 63.09 66.64 63.04 0.32 57.26 65.52 57.14 0.05 
















 MY 37.32 48.88 26.60 0.00 40.53 50.09 31.63 0.00 
NL 63.14 85.12 62.75 0.00 70.53 85.43 70.27 0.01 
NO 64.62 82.94 57.03 0.00 61.74 78.55 54.78 0.00 








 PH 43.30 30.37 46.54 0.03 48.75 46.97 49.78 0.68 
PL 34.78 34.52 34.90 0.91 34.85 46.91 25.09 0.00 
PT 56.18 59.68 56.06 0.57 67.15 79.06 64.54 0.02 
RU 34.90 42.22 30.37 0.00 52.53 63.43 45.83 0.00 
SE 66.35 68.01 66.15 0.74 64.50 79.00 63.73 0.00 
SG 35.14 37.99 33.60 0.11 40.67 51.22 34.88 0.00 
TH 47.37 61.70 36.62 0.00 50.58 61.63 42.60 0.00 
TR 51.33 41.18 54.22 0.03 49.65 29.56 56.31 0.00 
US 45.00 21.92 45.09 0.00 44.82 21.37 44.88 0.00 
ZA 40.54 41.20 40.04 0.81 60.46 72.73 59.42 0.00 
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Table IA.2. (continued) 
Country SOCSCORE SOCSCORE SOCSCORE p-value CGVSCORE CGVSCORE CGVSCORE p-value 
  All State_own=1 State_own=0 (1 - 0) All State_own=1 State_own=0 (1 - 0) 
Total 52.07 61.88 51.41 0.00 53.36 41.67 54.24 0.00 
AT 56.08 87.38 46.75 0.00 33.32 48.26 28.71 0.00 
AU 39.30 52.69 39.24 0.04 63.42 71.81 63.44 0.10 
BE 52.96 67.52 52.04 0.09 50.56 52.84 50.49 0.59 
BR 64.11 86.21 58.72 0.00 27.24 28.04 27.11 0.67 
CA 39.72 26.66 39.90 0.00 73.74 73.80 73.75 0.99 
CH 56.61 56.39 56.61 0.97 47.10 39.11 47.62 0.11 
CL 44.91 44.76 45.29 0.95 9.26 9.33 9.31 0.99 
CN 25.40 30.71 15.48 0.00 24.59 26.33 21.33 0.05 
CO 71.34 77.48 62.04 0.24 28.21 32.82 22.20 0.23 
CZ 70.32 75.72 67.23 0.02 18.27 24.79 14.55 0.00 








 EG 27.24 12.45 29.99 0.00 8.64 2.30 9.77 0.00 
ES 78.12 94.15 77.98 0.00 50.24 55.75 50.15 0.24 
FI 70.35 85.47 67.44 0.00 60.87 63.32 60.51 0.32 
FR 78.17 81.77 77.74 0.06 55.07 51.64 55.55 0.12 
GB 63.31 67.70 63.25 0.22 73.89 65.51 74.08 0.00 
GR 50.69 67.35 44.55 0.00 17.72 23.84 15.49 0.00 
HK 35.98 38.76 35.82 0.23 36.48 41.96 35.11 0.00 
HU 78.51 34.34 91.50 0.00 41.16 34.47 43.12 0.11 
ID 62.82 71.48 56.43 0.00 26.03 35.39 18.78 0.00 








 IN 58.84 61.23 58.25 0.38 29.11 14.91 32.89 0.00 
IT 64.23 86.13 57.51 0.00 43.97 53.81 41.01 0.00 
JP 47.32 57.70 47.16 0.02 11.96 13.77 11.94 0.30 
















 MY 49.12 64.32 34.62 0.00 46.94 58.28 35.29 0.00 
NL 77.46 90.48 77.23 0.00 64.51 74.15 64.34 0.00 
NO 69.81 89.97 61.45 0.00 63.62 71.78 60.24 0.00 








 PH 45.31 57.02 43.73 0.15 28.78 27.42 29.15 0.76 
PL 42.30 55.41 31.83 0.00 23.24 27.09 20.18 0.02 
PT 76.88 88.50 74.62 0.00 56.78 46.00 58.71 0.13 
RU 54.68 62.50 49.59 0.00 28.74 28.03 29.40 0.64 
SE 64.94 85.60 63.74 0.00 54.29 64.16 53.80 0.01 
SG 40.79 52.71 34.38 0.00 43.78 53.16 38.97 0.00 
TH 59.71 73.89 49.45 0.00 45.53 48.97 42.73 0.11 
TR 55.79 38.17 61.65 0.00 22.47 19.94 23.09 0.29 
US 47.61 23.52 47.68 0.00 74.15 71.84 74.17 0.30 




Table IA.3. Comparisons by Industries 
This table presents the averages of state ownership dummy (State_own), environmental pillar score (ENVSCORE and sub-scores: emission 
reduction ENER, product innovation ENPI, resource reduction ENRR), social pillar score (SOCSCORE), and corporate governance pillar 
score (CGVSCORE) in ten different industries: Basic Materials, Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Financials, Health Care, Industrials, 
Oil & Gas, Technology, Telecommunications, and Utilities. We also conduct t-tests for the difference in averages across state-owned and 
non-state-owned firms and report the p-value based on unequal variance. 
 
Industry Obs State_own ENVSCORE ENVSCORE ENVSCORE p-value ENER ENER ENER p-value 








=0 (1 - 0) 
Basic Materials 3015 0.056 55.58 59.84 55.40 0.07 58.38 62.94 58.16 0.05 
Consumer Goods 3,370 0.019 61.55 47.15 61.90 0.00 59.96 48.85 60.26 0.00 
Consumer Services 3,992 0.023 41.05 52.56 40.79 0.00 41.00 58.37 40.59 0.00 
Financials 5,059 0.069 43.23 46.36 43.04 0.06 41.47 40.42 41.60 0.50 
Health Care 1,633 0.010 43.79 20.76 44.06 0.00 44.24 27.83 44.43 0.04 
Industrials 5,610 0.053 59.08 53.83 59.38 0.00 57.31 56.64 57.35 0.70 
Oil & Gas 2,061 0.126 45.48 64.61 42.69 0.00 51.42 68.79 48.86 0.00 
Technology 1,960 0.021 51.69 63.00 51.46 0.03 48.05 61.04 47.79 0.01 
Telecommunications 771 0.317 55.43 63.37 51.95 0.00 54.71 62.69 51.13 0.00 
Utilities 1405 0.256 63.53 64.80 63.32 0.36 69.93 69.70 70.23 0.73 
Total 28,876 0.066 51.52 57.40 51.14 0.00 51.46 58.81 50.97 0.00 
Industry     ENPI ENPI ENPI p-value ENRR ENRR ENRR p-value 








=0 (1 - 0) 
Basic Materials 
  
49.57 51.01 49.59 0.58 55.14 59.51 54.92 0.06 
Consumer Goods 
  
59.38 41.96 59.78 0.00 60.85 48.94 61.14 0.00 
Consumer Services 
  
36.90 36.17 36.96 0.77 46.01 57.66 45.74 0.00 
Financials 
  
42.89 50.33 42.37 0.00 45.26 47.01 45.16 0.32 
Health Care 
  
39.91 23.61 40.13 0.02 47.33 21.12 47.59 0.00 
Industrials 
  
59.43 47.52 60.11 0.00 56.19 54.50 56.29 0.33 
Oil & Gas 
  
40.69 53.47 38.81 0.00 44.08 63.28 41.27 0.00 
Technology 
  
55.58 63.88 55.42 0.10 50.57 64.41 50.28 0.01 
Telecommunications 
  
51.54 56.74 49.26 0.00 56.74 64.96 53.09 0.00 
Utilities     53.16 54.94 52.68 0.19 59.50 61.85 58.91 0.07 
Total     49.16 51.16 49.07 0.01 51.73 57.41 51.36 0.00 
Industry 
  
SOCSCORE SOCSCORE SOCSCORE p-value CGVSCORE CGVSCORE CGVSCORE p-value 








=0 (1 - 0) 
Basic Materials 
  
53.39 63.75 52.79 0.00 54.89 53.80 55.03 0.62 
Consumer Goods 
  
57.76 44.97 58.06 0.00 46.95 38.20 47.21 0.02 
Consumer Services 
  
46.35 54.08 46.17 0.01 53.55 43.93 53.82 0.00 
Financials 
  
46.02 54.30 45.49 0.00 49.99 37.60 50.98 0.00 
Health Care 
  
50.63 26.25 50.91 0.00 55.82 29.47 56.15 0.00 
Industrials 
  
55.40 55.26 55.41 0.93 52.47 41.08 53.13 0.00 
Oil & Gas 
  
48.52 67.23 45.80 0.00 63.62 41.12 66.86 0.00 
Technology 
  
51.53 60.40 51.32 0.06 58.82 48.78 59.13 0.03 
Telecommunications 
  
62.53 69.97 59.15 0.00 52.13 48.34 54.09 0.01 
Utilities     62.40 71.35 59.56 0.00 55.66 36.14 62.43 0.00 
Total     52.08 61.88 51.42 0.00 53.36 41.67 54.24 0.00 
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Table IA.4. Comparisons by Sample Years 
This table presents the averages of state ownership dummy (State_own), environmental pillar score (ENVSCORE and sub-scores: emission 
reduction ENER, product innovation ENPI, resource reduction ENRR), social pillar score (SOCSCORE), and corporate governance pillar score 
(CGVSCORE) in each year from 2004 to 2014. We also conduct t-tests for the difference in averages across state-owned and non-state-owned 
firms and report the p-value based on unequal variance.  
  
Year Obs State_own ENVSCORE ENVSCORE ENVSCORE p-value ENER ENER ENER p-value 
      All State_own=1 State_own=0 (1 - 0) All State_own=1 State_own=0 (1 - 0) 
2004 1,463 0.037 49.26 59.41 48.87 0.02 48.87 58.13 48.52 0.03 
2005 1,829 0.042 49.38 59.31 48.95 0.00 49.10 59.43 48.65 0.00 
2006 1,858 0.043 49.71 56.96 49.43 0.04 49.43 56.24 49.19 0.05 
2007 2,005 0.048 51.46 59.37 51.06 0.01 51.25 60.31 50.77 0.00 
2008 2,395 0.060 52.05 58.77 51.64 0.01 51.75 60.93 51.18 0.00 
2009 2,764 0.063 51.77 55.25 51.54 0.14 51.68 57.92 51.28 0.01 
2010 3,174 0.075 51.96 55.91 51.59 0.05 51.88 57.45 51.39 0.01 
2011 3,270 0.075 51.99 56.54 51.65 0.02 52.00 58.32 51.52 0.00 
2012 3,404 0.078 51.60 56.69 51.12 0.01 51.70 58.43 51.08 0.00 
2013 3,473 0.077 51.54 58.34 51.14 0.00 51.76 59.60 51.25 0.00 
2014 3,255 0.079 53.10 58.51 52.85 0.01 53.19 59.76 52.81 0.00 
Total 28,890 0.066 51.51 57.40 51.13 0.00 51.45 58.81 50.96 0.00 
Year     ENPI ENPI ENPI p-value ENRR ENRR ENRR p-value 
      All State_own=1 State_own=0 (1 - 0) All State_own=1 State_own=0 (1 - 0) 
2004 
  
46.66 53.60 46.39 0.06 48.72 59.32 48.31 0.01 
2005 
  
46.73 45.97 46.77 0.81 48.93 63.15 48.31 0.00 
2006 
  
47.22 45.61 47.36 0.60 49.57 60.40 49.07 0.00 
2007 
  
49.35 53.46 49.15 0.19 51.50 58.81 51.13 0.02 
2008 
  
50.23 54.04 50.02 0.15 52.24 57.03 51.94 0.07 
2009 
  
49.84 49.66 49.85 0.94 51.81 55.12 51.60 0.16 
2010 
  
49.56 50.92 49.41 0.47 52.22 54.86 51.96 0.18 
2011 
  
49.55 50.71 49.47 0.56 52.41 56.62 52.09 0.03 
2012 
  
49.26 50.55 49.14 0.49 52.26 57.08 51.80 0.01 
2013 
  
49.17 52.63 49.05 0.08 52.04 58.16 51.67 0.00 
2014     50.40 52.18 50.46 0.41 53.48 58.31 53.22 0.01 
Total     49.16 51.16 49.07 0.01 51.72 57.41 51.34 0.00 
Year 
  
SOCSCORE SOCSCORE SOCSCORE p-value CGVSCORE CGVSCORE CGVSCORE p-value 
      All State_own=1 State_own=0 (1 - 0) All State_own=1 State_own=0 (1 - 0) 
2004 
  
50.50 60.96 50.10 0.01 52.64 41.29 53.08 0.01 
2005 
  
50.32 62.22 49.80 0.00 51.86 44.41 52.19 0.03 
2006 
  
50.67 62.17 50.13 0.00 51.95 42.40 52.43 0.00 
2007 
  
51.74 60.83 51.26 0.00 52.21 44.70 52.60 0.01 
2008 
  
52.36 61.31 51.79 0.00 52.78 38.62 53.70 0.00 
2009 
  
51.83 60.41 51.27 0.00 52.88 36.72 54.01 0.00 
2010 
  
52.25 60.69 51.54 0.00 53.93 38.51 55.13 0.00 
2011 
  
52.45 62.17 51.70 0.00 53.80 40.37 54.95 0.00 
2012 
  
51.95 61.55 51.10 0.00 53.78 44.93 54.61 0.00 
2013 
  
52.12 62.88 51.37 0.00 53.86 42.35 55.04 0.00 
2014     54.27 63.75 53.66 0.00 54.91 44.85 55.94 0.00 
Total     52.07 61.88 51.41 0.00 53.36 41.67 54.24 0.00 
 
 
